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 ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON ENTREPRENUERSHIP AND PUBLIC POLICY 
ALICIA MORGAN PLEMMONS 
AUGUST 2019 
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace.  
Major Department: Economics. 
 This dissertation consists of three chapters empirically analyzing how public policy 
affects firm behavior, with a particular emphasis on small, entrepreneurial firms.  
 The first chapter analyzes how occupational licensing affects firm entry and employment 
decisions. Occupational licensing is a government permission to work within a specific job 
classification. The costs to firms of paying to license employees can be a substantial 
consideration when firms are making location and hiring decisions. Using individual firm-level 
data I analyze how these costs affect firms by determining how differences in costs across state 
borders affect the likelihood of firms entering on a particular side of a state-pair. I find firms are 
less likely to enter in an expensive state if a substantially cheaper state is within a short distance. 
I also utilize a geographic regression discontinuity design and determine that firms on the more 
expensive side of a state border pair have approximately 2.3 employees fewer on average. 
Comparing similar licensed and unlicensed industries I find evidence of a persistent decrease in 
average employment for licensed firms in high cost states relative to unlicensed firms.   
The second chapter investigates potential gender related bias in equity, debt, and 
philanthropic contribution financing decisions for early-stage African entrepreneurial ventures. 
Utilizing a series of individual estimations and a two-stage Heckman Selection Model on 
questionnaire results from 2,812 early-stage entrepreneurs in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
 Uganda, and South Africa, I find substantial evidence of a negative effect of having a female 
primary founder on the probability of being selected for equity funding but that this bias does not 
persist in the amount of equity funding the venture attracts. I find that in the case of debt and 
lending finance, female entrepreneurs are subject to a lower probability of being selected for 
funding and smaller total amounts of debt financing. Philanthropic contributions present an 
interesting alternative, and do not have any related gender bias in the initial selection or funding 
amount. This paper provides policy recommendations for encouraging female entrepreneurship, 
which has been shown to contribute to long-term sustainable economic growth.  
The third chapter explores the unintended consequences of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) on the entry and exit behaviors of 
small businesses. BAPCPA implemented significant changes to consumer bankruptcy law which 
had many unintended consequences for debtors, creditors, and consumers. Since small 
businesses are often unincorporated and therefore the financial assets and debts of the company 
cannot be separated from the owner, bankruptcy serves as a crucial form of partial wealth 
protection for self-employed and small business owners. This study focuses on how the 
implementation of BAPCPA affected small businesses entry and exit rates by utilizing a 
Difference-in-Difference methodology. A Triple-Differencing method is also incorporated to 
account for potential differences in small business entry and exit behaviors in low and high 
personal homestead exemption states. I find that BAPCPA decreased the entry rate of small 
businesses by approximately 4.91% and increased exit rates by 2.74%. These effects vary 
substantially across industries. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Entrepreneurship and, more generally, business development play a crucial role in 
economic growth and prosperity. This dissertation contains a collection of three essays that seek 
to understand various aspects of business development, primarily behavior changes in response 
to new regulations, as well as the existence of differential credit constraints.  
In Chapter 1, I analyze how occupational licensing affects firm entry and employment 
decisions in the United States. To empirically examine these entry and exit decisions, I focus on 
firms near state border because they would have the lowest cost to relocated their business and 
this methodology allows for the control of local and geographical heterogeneity.  Using 
individual firm-level data I utilize a series of logistic regressions and determine that firms are 
less likely to enter expensive states when less expensive alternatives are located within a short 
distance. Then, to study employment behavior, I implement a geographic regression 
discontinuity design and find that the point estimate of expensive states have 2.3 fewer average 
employees compared to their low cost border counterparts. To provide additional insight into the 
causal effects of occupational licensing difference on firm employment behaviors, I use a non-
temporal difference-in-difference framework to compare the employment patterns of similar 
unlicensed and licensed firms across low and high licensing cost border pairs. I find there is 
some evidence of an additional negative effect to average firm employment for licensed firms in 
high cost states that are not explained by the individual estimations.  
Chapter 2, focuses on relationship of gender bias in entrepreneurial financing patterns in 
Africa, thereby affecting the credit constraints of male and female entrepreneurs 
heterogeneously. Access to capital is crucial to firm and development, and Africa has cultural 
and developmental barriers to credit access that need to be understood in order to design 
 2 
effective policy. Gender bias in equity, debt, or philanthropic contribution financing can happen 
at two points: 1. in the initial decision to fund a project or not; and 2. in the amount of funding 
granted. In this chapter, I use data from a survey of early-stage entrepreneurs in six African 
nations to determine if there is evidence of gender bias in the two funding decisions. I first 
estimate these decisions individually, and then correct for possible selection bias in the initial 
financing decision that may influence the evidence of bias in the amount of funds by utilizing 
Heckman Selection methods. I find evidence of a gender bias in both decisions for equity and 
debt financing. Interestingly, this bias does not exist in philanthropic contribution finance.  
Finally, Chapter 3 seeks to determine if the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) disproportionately harmed small businesses in the short-term 
after implementation. Small business ownership and self-employment can be inherently risky as 
often these businesses are unincorporated and therefore the assets and debts of the business 
cannot be separated from the owner. Therefore, in the case of unincorporated firms, bankruptcy 
serves as a means of partial wealth protection for these individuals. I use a difference-in-
difference model, and find evidence of a significant decrease in small business entry and an 
increase in small business exits over the policy period that is not accounted for by the individual 
estimations. I then examine if there are additional policy effects in states with low personal 
homestead exemptions relative to states with high exemptions using a triple-differencing model. 
I find no evidence to suggest that the different level of exemptions interact with the policy to 
cause heterogenous entry and exit rates of small firms.  
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Chapter 1: Occupational Licensing Effects on Firm Entry and Employment 
1. Introduction 
Twenty-nine percent of the United States workforce required an occupational license in 
2010, which is greater than the percentage of workers directly impacted by unions or the 
minimum wage (Kleiner & Krueger 2013). An occupational license is a government permission 
to work within a specific job classification, the requirements for which are often determined by 
each individual state. A person attempting to obtain an occupational license will incur costs in 
the form of monetary fees, examinations, and days required to complete education and 
experience mandates. Obtaining an occupational license for employees, or paying a wage 
premium for licensed workers, constitutes a significant cost consideration for firms. These costs 
may influence whether a business enters into a market or hires employees. Understanding the 
relationship between occupational licensing costs and firm decisions have important policy 
implications for how a state encourages business development and employment. 
There is a growing body of literature focusing on the costs and benefits of occupational 
licensing. Proponents cite the benefits of occupational licensing as the protection of public 
health, consumer safety, and higher wages for employees (Kleiner & Krueger 2010). Opponents 
of the current form of regulations claim these benefits are outweighed by the harm caused from 
increased prices for consumers, failure to reduce the wage dispersion, and reduced aggregate 
economic mobility (Cox & Foster 1990, Carroll & Gaston 1981, Kleiner & Krueger 2010, 
Meehan et al. 2017). Wage premiums for license-holding employees in heavily regulated 
industries tend to be larger in states with steeper occupational licensing costs (Akerlof 1970, 
Sharpio 1986, Kleiner & Krueger 2013, Timmons & Thornton 2008). The effects of these wage 
premiums on firm location and hiring decisions, however has yet to be investigated.   
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The purpose of this study is to analyze how occupational licensing regulations influence 
entry and employment decisions of firms by analyzing the patterns exhibited by businesses that 
are located near state borders. In this study, I analyze the likelihood that a firm will enter the 
market from a specific side of a state border, given the differences in licensing costs, using a 
series of logistical functions. To observe differences in firm employment patterns over state 
borders I utilize a geographic regression discontinuity design to determine if there is a systematic 
difference in the average number of employees per firm, in bins of distance from the state border, 
between high- and low-cost states. Finally, to further substantiate claims of causal differences in 
average firm employment, I perform a non-temporal difference in difference analysis between a 
variety of firm-industry pairs that perform similar business functions. In each pair of firms, one 
firm generally employs workers that require occupational licensing in most states, while the 
other does not. The purpose of this approach is to confirm that changes in firm entry decisions 
are influenced by occupational licensing costs, and not other state or industry trends.  
Previous studies focus on the effects of occupational licensing regulations on employees 
in the form of wage premiums, and on consumers in the form of price and quality changes for 
goods and services. To my knowledge, I develop one of the first spatial models for 
understanding the relationship between firm density and occupational licensing costs near state 
borders. My empirical methodology provides an analytical explanation of firm entry decisions 
and the causal effects of occupational licensing costs on firm employment near state borders. In 
doing so, I explain how these regulations affect decisions and preferences of firms, which can 
have widespread effects on local labor markets and state tax revenue. 
I find an increased probability of firms entering on the cheaper side of a state border pair 
as occupational licensing cost differences increase. The magnitude of these correlations is larger 
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for businesses in labor-intensive industries. Using a geographic regression discontinuity 
framework, I find negative point estimations for differences in average firm employment in high-
cost states relative to low-cost states. There are substantial discontinuities in employment around 
state borders which are persistent even after accounting for population and geographic attributes. 
Comparing pairs of industries that differ only in their occupational licensing requirements, I find 
that there is a substantial negative effect on average firm employment for licensed firms in high-
cost states that are not present for unlicensed firms.  
The paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 provides details on the data that will be used for analysis. Section 4 develops 
the empirical models that will be used to analyze the three different specifications of firm-levels. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results of the models. Section 6 concludes and discusses policy 
relevance. 
2. Literature Review 
 According to the overview of occupational licensing history by Law & Kim (2005), 
governments introduced occupational licensing to help consumers understand and judge the 
quality of professional services. Technological advances and increased professional 
specialization had made it increasingly difficult for individuals to judge differences between 
service providers. The ideological benefit of occupational licensing is to decrease consumer 
uncertainty and increase demand for licensed services by signaling to the consumer, through the 
license, what the service provider does, and that the license holder is qualified to provide that 
service. Conversely, the lack of a license for a specific service subject to licensing regulations, 
informs the consumer that the service provider is not legally qualified to provide that good or 
service (Arrow 1971). For most industries, an individual state chooses whether an occupation is 
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subject to occupational licensing; likewise, states choose the fees, education, and experience 
requirements to meet the standards for that job. These requirements often differ drastically 
between states. Researchers have focused on occupational licensing, even though there are 
alternatives such as certifications and output monitoring, since these alternatives are far less 
prevalent in most industries (Cox & Foster 1990). Within the United States, the proportion of 
jobs that require some sort of occupational license has grown from approximately 4% of the 
workforce in the early 1950s, to 29% of the workforce in 2008 (Kleiner & Krueger 2013). 
 In recent decades, a substantial amount of literature has centered on analyzing the costs 
and benefits of occupational licensing. These studies typically focus on the effects of 
occupational licensing on either workers or consumers. Workers who are subject to occupational 
licensing often benefit from wage premiums; however, at the economy level, some studies find 
these licenses may have reduced aggregate economic mobility and failed their goal of wage 
dispersion (Kleiner & Krueger 2010, Kleiner & Krueger 2013, Kleiner & Krueger 2013, Meehan 
et al. 2017). Consumers are subject to substantial changes in cost through price effects. These 
price effects, in theory, represent payments for increased public health, safety, and quality of 
goods and services (Arrow 1971).  
 A variety of literature finds evidence of a wage premium for individual workers who hold 
an occupational license. The primary argument supporting this wage premium is that it 
incentivizes individuals to invest in occupational specific education, training, and examinations. 
The wage premium provides workers with the ability to recoup a return on investment costs, by 
making it more difficult for consumers to substitute the services of license holders with lower-
quality versions of the same service (Akerlof 1970, Sharpio 1986). Gittleman et al. (2018) find 
that individuals who invested into human capital and obtained a license earn higher pay, are 
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more likely to be employed within their field, and also have a higher probability of access to 
employer sponsored health care. Survey data finds that having a government issued occupational 
license is associated with an approximate 18% differential in increased wages (Kleiner & 
Krueger 2013). Other research studies have focused on the wage premium associated with 
specific industries. Timmons & Thornton (2008) concluded that after controlling for various 
types of endogeneity, there is a licensing premium of up to 6.9% for radiological technologists in 
states that require licenses. Perloff (1980) focuses on the construction industry and finds that, 
though product market conditions have the largest effect on wage changes when a license has 
been established in the industry for some time, there is evidence that when there is an increase in 
a related but unlicensed industry there is often an increase in the licensed construction industry 
that continues to maintain a wage premium between the two. In contrast, a study by Guis (2016) 
finds a lack of evidence for this wage premium in many industries at the state level, but still finds 
statistically significant effects for child care workers, opticians, and veterinary technicians.  
 These wage premiums are designed to incentivize education and training, promote public 
health and safety, and to increase overall quality of goods and services. Yet, studies on the 
quality benefits of occupational licensing in the United States have had mixed results. Holen 
(1965) finds that increased stringency in the occupational licensing for dentists increased the 
quality of care, while decreasing the likelihood of adverse outcomes. Kleiner & Kudrle (2000), 
in an observational study of Air Force recruits’ dental quality, find increased stringency on 
occupational licensing has no effect on the overall quality of dental work. While, even further, 
Carroll & Gaston (1981) find that licensing practitioners decreases the total stock of practitioners 
and lowers overall quality of dental services. The contradicting results of these three studies 
illustrates the inconclusive nature of research attempting to measure effects on quality outcomes 
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within occupational licensing literature. Within research on the quality effects about student 
outcomes of teacher licensing, Angrist & Guryan (2008) find that state-mandated testing of 
teachers had no effect on overall teacher quality. Kane et al. (2008) analyze licensed, unlicensed, 
and certified teachers in New York City and find little differences in student achievement. 
Maurizi (1974) finds that for contractors who are subject to higher standards when obtaining a 
license that there is enhanced quality for large and relatively well-off consumers, but the results 
were inconclusive when looking at smaller consumers. 
 Though the quality effects of occupational licensing restrictions are inconclusive, 
consumers are also affected by price changes. Conrad & Sheldon (1982) finds that restrictions on 
the number of firm branches and dental assistant’s procedures led to a 4% increase in consumer 
prices. In the Kleiner & Kudrle (2000) study mentioned above, they find that when analyzing 
measures of restrictiveness, as determined by exam pass rates for dentists, states saw substantial 
increases in prices when restrictions were increased for dental services.  In similar studies for 
optometry, Bond et al. (1980) and Haas-Wilson (1986) find that increases in the prices of eye 
exams and eye glasses in states with restrictions on optometrists’ commercial practices were 
associated with no statistically significant effects on quality. These increased prices may also 
result in consumers eventually lowering their demand over time as they substitute away from the 
service. For example, a study on cosmetologists finds that additional regulations represent a 
statistically significant increase of the cost to consumers in the form of higher prices for 
cosmetology services; and faced with these increased prices, consumers reduced their number of 
visits per year by nearly 14% (Adams et al. 2002). 
The wage premium for licensed employees can represent an additional cost for firms who 
wish to enter or remain in a market. The costs to firms cannot always be offset with increases in 
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prices because they may harm demand over time. To avoid these costs, firms may self-select into 
areas where they have the lowest cost to open and conduct business. Since occupational licensing 
costs are determined at the state level, there can be large differences in cost on either side of a 
state border, even if the local physical attributes of the location are the same. This study attempts 
to shift the focus away from consumers and employees, and instead investigates how 
occupational licensing affects business decisions, including where a firm operates and how many 
employees they hire. 
Zapletal (2017) is the closest study to my own, as it focuses on the location decisions of 
businesses, though their study focuses specifically on personal care industries. They find that 
license restrictiveness affected business’ decisions to enter and exit the market, but not their 
overall quality, services, or prices for cosmetology related services. Other studies find effects on 
the interstate migration of the labor force but have not specifically focused on firms, except for 
sole proprietorships.  Kleiner & Vorotnikov (2017) use cross-sectional data of each state to 
analyze the qualitative differences between states. They find considerable variation in the 
percentage of the states’ workforce that obtained licenses, and large variations in the effect of 
licensing between states. Johnson & Kleiner (2017) look at 22 occupations and find that state 
specific occupational licensing leads to a decline in interstate migration and job transitions. 
Pashigian (1979) looks at lawyers, many of whom operate as sole proprietorships, and finds that 
occupational licensing has a large effect in reducing the interstate mobility of these professionals 
after they have obtained a license in a state. In this study, I am interested in whether these effects 
influence the likelihood of where a business will enter the market, with the consideration that 
there are additional costs in the form of wage premiums or payments for workers to maintain 
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licenses. Firms also must consider, when choosing a location for their business, that the labor 
force in these regulated industries is less mobile between states. 
Oftentimes self-employed individuals, sole-proprietors, or limited partnerships differ 
from incorporated firms in their size and hiring practices. Regardless of firm structure type, both 
small and large businesses are subject to the same occupational regulation requirement for their 
employees if they want to work in regulated industries. The influence of occupational licensing 
for smaller or younger firms is of crucial importance as we are transitioning from a 
manufacturing to a service-based economy (Kleiner & Krueger 2013). van Stel et al. (2007) 
looks at how business regulations affect nascent and young business entrepreneurship and finds 
that labor market regulations, in the form of increased capital requirements, decrease 
entrepreneurship rates. This could mean that the increased cost of conducting business, as a 
result of the fees to obtain occupational licenses, may be substantial overhead for a new firm that 
may cause them to choose to not open for business.  
 The selection into self-employment under the constraints of occupational licensing has 
different effects depending on if there are close complement or substitute industries that are not 
subject to the same rigorous standards. Kleiner & Park (2010) analyze the question of how 
occupational licensing and government regulation affects dentists and dental hygienists, which 
can be considered to be both complements and substitutes for each other. States vary in whether 
they allow for dental hygienists to operate as self-employed, or if they must work under the 
supervision of a dentist. Kleiner & Park (2010) find that hygienists in states that allow them to be 
self-employed maintained about 10% higher earnings, while dentists in those states have lower 
earnings and employment growth. States also differ in how they regulate self-employed 
individuals in the growing ‘gig-economy,’ which includes jobs in which independent workers 
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agree to work short-term engagements, such as ride-sharing and short-term single contract 
projects. Kleiner (2017) focuses on the self-employed individuals of the gig-economy through an 
analysis of the Uber market and finds that cities imposing more rigorous licensing standards have 
fewer Uber drivers per capita, as well as higher base fares. The self-employed and 
entrepreneurial business sectors have higher proportions of immigrant workers relative to their 
percentage of the population. Self-employment and entrepreneurship can often serve as an 
important means of employment for immigrant workers that may not have been subject to the 
same rigor of education requirements to maintain previous employment. Immigrants seeking to 
start a business face additional barriers to entry, in the form of complicated application processes 
and language requirements (Federman et al. 2006). Slivinski (2017) looks broadly at the burden 
of occupational licensing on immigrant entrepreneurs, and finds that states with higher than 
average occupational licensing requirements have lower rates of immigrant entrepreneurship. 
3. Data 
3.1 Occupational Licensing 
 State requirements for occupational licensing were acquired from the Institute for Justice 
License to Work (LTW) 2017 update. The LTW distinguishes between reported occupations that 
require an occupational license and those that require only a certification. An occupational 
license requirement is when government authorization is required to legally perform the services 
of that occupation. For example, an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) requires an 
occupational license in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, this means that a license must 
be obtained to work as an EMT in any capacity. Consequently, a non-licensed individual may 
not be hired for an EMT position. Certifications differ in that, while they also signal competency 
in a field, they are not required to perform a specific service. For example, a bartender may 
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obtain a certification in 38 states but can still be a bartender without the certification. In this case 
the EMT data would be included in LTW report data for all states, but the bartender would not 
be considered under the burden of an occupational license in the certification-only states. This 
report measures the regulatory burden associated with 102 commonly regulated occupations 
within all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Information on each regulated occupation 
includes fees, examinations, and the calendar days necessary to complete mandatory education 
and experience requirements. Though this report does not cover every occupation subject to an 
occupational license, it is the largest currently available database of licenses, and these measures 
can serve to provide a foundation for determining a states’ regulatory environment and 
stringency.  
 Tables 3 and 4 contain summary statistics for the state-level variables and cross-
differenced state-level variables, respectively. To measure the regulatory environment of a state, 
simple averages are taken across occupations of the monetary fees and number of calendar days 
required to complete mandatory education and training for obtaining a license. These variables 
allow for the comparison of differences in regulatory environments between states. For the U.S., 
Nevada is the most expensive state in terms of monetary fees, with $704 being the average cost 
of an occupational license. The least expensive is Nebraska, where the average cost for a license 
is $76. Across the states the mean is $268.14, with a standard deviation of $113.77. In regards to 
calendar days required to complete mandatory education and training, Pennsylvania has the 
shortest number of average days required at 117.2 days. Hawaii, in comparison, has the largest 
average estimated days required to complete mandatory education and training at 988 days. For 
the U.S. the mean is 373.7 days, with a standard deviation of 199.5 days. Both variables are 
approximately standard normal in their distribution.  
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3.2 Firm-Level Characteristics 
 I obtained data on firm characteristics and locations through large-scale web scraping 
from a popular sales lead company, Reference USA, during April 2017. This data is collected at 
the firm level, as opposed to earlier studies that used establishment data aggregated to the zip-
code or county level. Collected variables include the exact longitude and latitude of the firm 
location, SIC and NAICS codes at the six-digit level, employee and sales estimations, credit 
ratings, etc. Figure 1 contains a map of the exact locations for the 3,174,670 firms in my sample. 
The firms contained in this data set were established between 1994 and 2016 and are located 
within the continental United States. This study is limited to companies that were established 
from 1994 to present because the focus of the study is on companies from the internet age. The 
internet drastically changed the ability of companies to conduct sales and services at a distance, 
which affects business entry and location decisions. 
Figure 1: Map of All Firm Locations 
Map of business locations for 3,174,670 firms 
 
The data used in this study contains information on the industry classification of each 
firm. Table 1 contains summary statistics for the number of firm observations within 9 major 
industry classifications. This information allows for the same interactions to be analyzed for 
subsets of data, to determine if occupational licensing burdens have a larger effect within 
specific industries. The smallest industry in the data set, with 19,188 firms representing 
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approximately 0.60% of the total firm data, is the Public Administration industry. The largest 
industry, representing 46.01% of the data with 1,460,624 firms, is the Services sector. These 
industries are defined at the 2-digit NAICS level, though future research may be determined at 
more specific 4- and 6-digit NAICS levels as well. 
3.3 Similar Industry Matches 
To address possible endogeneity concerns for the relationship between occupational 
licensing and average firm employment, I identify pairs of firms who perform similar economic 
functions that differ in whether they generally hire licensed employees. This is often difficult 
because in most cases similar business types fall under the same six-digit NAICS code. Since 
data is unavailable for the occupational licensing of every individual firm employee, 
generalizations must be made to attempt to compare industries. Though these matches are not 
perfect substitutes for each other, they provide insight into whether industries that are known to 
hire workers with occupational licenses have significant average employment differences, by 
comparing them to industries that should be unaffected. Table 2 shows the six business pairs that 
this study will compare in the empirical analysis.  
 Match Type (1) Transportation compares Taxi Services with Other Transit and Ground 
Passenger Transport. Taxi drivers are required to maintain special occupational licenses in 
sixteen states and most major cities. Since many states require occupational licenses for taxi 
drivers, this study identifies Taxi Services (NAICS 485310) as having generally licensed 
employees. Other Transit and Ground Passenger Transport (NAICS 485999) includes a wide 
variety of passenger transit, including shuttle services and van pools. Shuttle and van operators 
are often not required to have any additional occupational licensing, so this study defines these 
firms as having unlicensed employees.  
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 Match Type (2) contains firms that both perform similar functions in Architecture and 
Design. Architecture Services (NAICS 541310) is an industry that is comprised of firms who are 
primarily engaged in the architectural design of residential, institutional, commercial, and 
industrial buildings and structures. Architect is a job classification that requires an occupational 
license in all 50 states, and Washington D.C. Therefore, Architecture Services is considered as 
having generally licensed employees. Other Specialized Design Services (NAICS 541490) is an 
industry comprised of firms that are primary engaged in professional design services, except for 
architectural, landscape architecture, engineering, and interior design. Because of the exclusions 
of the largest design subsections that require licenses, Other Specialized Design Services 
perform similar design projects but with unlicensed employees.  
 Match Type (3) contains overlapping industries that conduct Building Repair. Residential 
Remodelers (NAICS 236118) is comprised of establishments responsible for remodeling 
construction projects for residential single-family and multifamily buildings. Projects that are 
valued at over $1000 of home repair generally require modifications to be conducted by 
employees who hold occupational licenses in various fields- these include electrical, cement, 
drywall, cabinetry, HVAC, etc. Since residential remodeling typically works with high valued 
projects, most of their employees hold occupational licenses in a related field. In a related 
classification Other Personal and Household Goods Repair and Maintenance (NAICS 811490) 
also contains firms who work on repairing and maintaining residential buildings but are often 
associated as working with lower value projects. Since these projects tend to have lower 
monetary cost, they may not require having an employed workforce with a variety of 
occupational license to keep with state requirements for housing. Therefore, for the purpose of 
this study, these firms are defined as having generally unlicensed employees.  
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 Match Type (4) focuses on firms that provide forms of Wellness. Offices of All Other 
Miscellaneous Health Care Practitioners (NAICS 621399) are establishments of private or group 
practices employing health care practitioners (except for physicians, dentists, chiropractors, 
optometrists, mental health specialists, physical therapists, audiologists, and podiatrists). This 
category includes health care professionals that are generally licensed employees such as dental 
hygienists, denturists, respiratory therapists, dietitians, and registered or licensed practical 
nurses. This industry classification has a close overlap in services with Other Personal Services 
(NAICS 812990). Other Personal Service includes many occupations including, but not limited 
to, personal fitness trainers, personal organizers, dating services, blood pressure testing machine 
operators, and comfort station operators that assist in generally unlicensed occupations that are 
related to general wellness.  
 Match Type (5) includes firms that are related to Landscaping. Landscaping Services 
(NAICS 561730) is the design and construction of landscaping plans. These landscaping services 
often require having generally licensed employees to design, construct, install, and maintain 
trees, gardens, walkways, decks, fences, and similar plants and structures. I compare this to the 
Nursery, Garden Center, and Firm Supply Store (NAICS 444220) because though the latter 
maintains and sells the plans and equipment used in landscaping, employees are generally 
unlicensed and do not require specialized occupational licenses to maintain or distribute these 
goods before they reach the customer.  
 Finally, Match Type (6) compares Lending Establishments. Commercial Banking 
(NAICS 522110) is subject to a wide variety of rules and regulations. These are firms that are 
primarily engaged in accepting demand and other deposits and making commercial and 
consumer loans. Since these loans are typically secured and subject to federal oversight, 
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commercial banking institutions hire many employees that are licensed in jobs such as 
accountants, bill collection, financial planning, title examiners, etc. This study defines the 
Consumer Banking industry as having licensed employees. Oppositely, Consumer Lending 
(NAICS 522291) is not subject to the same federal oversight since they are primarily engaged in 
making unsecured cash loans to consumers. These institutions do not offer the same range of 
financial services, and generally hire unlicensed employees to maintain their cash transactions. 
Commercial Banking and Consumer Lending industries are similar in that they both provide 
lending services to consumers. 
4. Model Specifications 
To identify the relationships between occupational licensing requirements, firm entry and 
employment decisions, I exploit variations in occupational licensing costs over state borders 
using multiple econometric techniques. First, I identify and analyze unusual clumping of firms in 
low cost states. I initially use a density manipulation test to determine if current firm locations 
could plausibly be randomly assigned or if there is evidence of manipulation of entry decisions 
across state borders. I then utilize a series of logit models to determine the probability that a new 
firm enters the market on a particular side of the border, given the differences in occupational 
licensing costs. 
Second, I exploit differences in costs over these state borders to determine if licensing 
requirements affect the average number of workers a business chooses to employ. I determine 
the effect of being located in the more expensive state on the average number of employees per 
business within bins of physical distance from a state border using a geographic regression 
discontinuity design. To address possible endogeneity from other state attributes, I attempt to 
tease out the relationship between cost and employment by conducting a non-temporal 
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difference-in-difference assessment on six industry pairs. These industry pairs are particularly 
useful because they serve similar market functions within the economy, with the difference that 
one industry in each pair generally requires licensed employees, while the other does not.  
4.1 Firm Entry 
4.1.1 Density Manipulation Test 
When analyzing firm entry patterns around state borders, it is necessary to determine if 
any observed patterns may be caused by arbitrary random assignment rather than purposeful 
manipulation. For each state border there are two adjacent states with different requirements for 
the days necessary to complete education and experience training as well as the average fees for 
people obtaining occupational licensing. The high-cost states are ones where workers on average 
will lose more calendar days of work to these requirements relative to the adjacent low-cost state, 
which is highly correlated with states with higher average fees relative to adjacent states. Figure 
4 represents the density of firms located within 10-kilometers of a state border. Firms on the left 
are in ‘low cost’ states, while firms on the right are in ‘high cost’. Visually observing Figure 4 it 
appears that there is a mass of firms slightly inside the low-cost state boundary. Though this may 
be visually convincing, I attempt to empirically determine if these densities are a product of 
arbitrary chance or if there is evidence of purposeful manipulation around the state border of 
firm entry.  
I formally test for manipulation of the firm density around the state border using a 
procedure developed by Cattaneo et al. (2018), referred to as a Density Manipulation Test 
(DMT).  Density manipulation testing around cutoffs are an extension of the local linear density 
estimator, first developed by Cheng (1997), and later introduced as a means of observing 
manipulation in regression discontinuities by McCrary (2008). Manipulation testing became a 
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feature for falsification testing around geographic borders with Cattaneo & Escanciano (2017). 
The DMT is conducted in two steps. First, I develop a finely gridded histogram, then it is 
smoothed using local linear regressions separately on either side of the cutoff. This method is 
useful in determining if discontinuities in the densities along the state border are determined by 
the treatment indicator of locating in a comparatively high-cost state. DMT results are discussed 
in Section 5.1.  
4.1.2 Logit Model 
Since there is evidence of manipulation of firm entry patterns around the state border, I 
conduct a series of logistical regressions to determine how differences in occupational licensing 
costs affect the probability that a firm will enter in a side of the border. I focus on firms that 
locate near state borders and exploit variation in occupational licensing requirements on firms 
that have relatively similar markets, geography, and other natural resources. I refer to businesses 
located near state boundaries as residing in a buffer zone. One of the cost measures of interest in 
this model is the calendar days required to complete education and experience training, which 
from here out will be referred to as ‘days required’. I account for average monetary fees through 
a binary variable representing if a states average occupational licensing fees are greater than the 
border-pair states fees by at least $100, though this variable is not the primary focus on this 
study. There are 109 different state border pairs that I use within my analysis. The methodology 
for determining which firms are included within a buffer zone of a state border is included in 
Appendix A.  
The firms that fall within these buffer zones constitute the subsamples by which I 
estimate the probability that a new firm enters the market on a particular side of the border. The 
logit model is as follows:  
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Lis = θ1(DR2-DR1)s + θ2Feess + Xi + γs + εis  (1) 
Li is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm is located on Side 2 of a boarder pair, and 0 if 
the firm is located on Side 1. The selection of which side of a border pair was assigned Side 2 is 
determined arbitrarily by whichever state had the greater FIPS code. The interior term (DR2-
DR1)s is the cross-border difference in days required for obtaining an occupational license 
between the two states, within the border pair that contains the firm. Feess is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if the cross-border difference in average fees is greater than $100. Xi is a vector of 
individual firm characteristics, and γs contains a vector of cross-border controls including labor 
force participation rate, minimum wage, state sales tax rates, and average local tax rates.  
Since the data is a cross-section of a collection of firms that existed in the United States 
in April of 2017, fixed effects to account for macroeconomic changes over time are unnecessary. 
Due to the nature of the data, the results of this model are meant to explore the correlation 
between policy differences and business entry decisions, rather than make claims of a causal 
nature.   
4.2 Firm Employment 
4.2.1 Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design 
Since occupational license costs differ over geographic boundaries, I utilize a multi-
dimensional discontinuity assessment in the longitude-latitude space. This means that I am 
implementing a regression discontinuity model design over physical space instead of time. 
Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design models (GRDD) are becoming more common 
within spatial literature to depict causal inferences from quasi-experimental policy structures. 
The most notable of these examples of exploiting geographic variation to estimate causality is 
the study by Card & Krueger (1994), who analyzed minimum wage law effects on the fast food 
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industry across the New Jersey and Pennsylvania space. Regression discontinuities based on 
geographic boundaries are an increasingly popular form of natural experiment in economics 
(Dell 2010, Keele et al. 2015, Cattaneo et al. forthcoming).  
The purpose of this methodological approach is to determine if there are discontinuities 
in the average number of employees between high-cost and low-cost states. High-cost 
(treatment) states are ones where employees have higher days required than adjacent low-cost 
(control) states. These high- and low-cost state pairs share a common border. This model 
determines the relationship between occupational licensing costs and the average number of 
employees within bins of distance that are determined by minimizing the mean squared error 
(MSE). The basic GRDD model is structured as follows:   
Yib = α + Tiτ + Xiβ-h + TiXiβ+h + Zi + λb + εib  (2) 
Yib represents the outcome variable of interest for observation i on border segment b, 
which is the average number of employees in bins, whose sizes are determined by minimizing 
the MSE. Ti is a treatment variable equal to one if the firm is located on the High Side of the 
state pair, and zero otherwise. τ is a series of weights determined using a local linear regression 
with triangular kernel estimation. Xi is the geographic distance from the closest state border, 
which is contained in a vector between X  (-h, h), where -h and +h represent bandwidths of 
distance from the border. Zi is a vector of cross-border control variables. λb represents border 
fixed effects for the 109 border pairs. Standard errors are clustered at the running variable.  
The motivation for this model is to determine if occupational licensing costs have a 
significant effect on average firm employment in more expensive states. To alleviate potential 
concern of endogeneity, I conduct a non-temporal difference-in-difference analysis to determine 
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if there are additional influences of occupational licensing laws on average employment of 
licensed firms compared to unlicensed firms over state borders.  
4.2.2 Difference-in-Difference 
Following the work of Card & Krueger (1994), the structure of eliciting the effect of a 
program or regulation between two groups has become a widespread practice in labor 
economics. Occupational licensing restrictions may have an impact on regulated industries but 
should theoretically have little to no effect on non-regulated industries. To understand the 
additional effect of a state’s occupational licensing restrictions relative to neighboring states, I 
compare the effects of being in a high-cost state versus a low-cost neighboring state for licensed 
versus unlicensed industries using a non-temporal Difference-in-Difference (DD) model. In this 
case I will compare a group who should be unaffected by changes in occupational licensing fees 
(control group) to a group that is subject to occupational licensing (treatment group). The non-
temporal DD model is different from the standard approach because instead of comparing two 
locations over time, it compares two industries over two locations. The model setup is as 
follows:  
Yisb = α + OLis + Hib + δ(OL*H)isb + εisb  (3) 
Yisb is our outcome of interest, the number of employees in a firm. OLis is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the business is part of the generally licensed industry, and 0 if not. The OLis 
variable is meant to capture possible differences between the treatment and control groups before 
analyzing the effect of being in a high cost state. The industry pairs for licensed and unlicensed 
firms are described in Section 3.3. Hib is also a dummy variable equal to 1 if the business is 
located on the border side with the more expensive, or "higher", occupational licensing fees. Hib 
captures aggregate factors that cause changes in the outcome variable between these states, even 
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in the absence of the licensing fees differences. The coefficient of interest, , multiplies the 
interaction terms (OL*H) which is the same dummy variable equal to one for those observations 
in the industry subject to occupational licensing, in the high cost state.  
The coefficients for the four possible combinations are as follows:  
 
NOLLow = α  (4) 
NOLHigh = α +   (5) 
OLLow = α +   (6) 
OLHigh = α +  +  +   (7) 
Where NOLow represents the industry set that is not subject to occupational licensing in 
the low-cost state. NOLHigh, OLLow, OLHigh, are the industry set that is not subject to occupational 
licensing in the high-cost state, the industry set subject to occupational licensing in the low-cost 
state, and the industry set subject to occupational licensing in the high cost state, respectively. 
Which means, to elicit the coefficient of interest, the DD estimate must be structured as follows:  
DDest = (OLHigh - OLLow) - (NOLHigh – NOLLow) =   (8) 
The interpretation and inferencing based upon the moderate sample sizes for each of 
these four groups is straight forward and is easily testable for robustness to various group and 
state variances in the regression framework. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Firm Entry 
Figure 4 depicts a histogram showing the density of firms within 10 kilometers of all 
shared state borders, with the low-cost state on the left and high-cost state on the right. The cost 
represented is the number of calendar days required to complete education and experience 
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training. These days required are often translated as a cost to firms in terms of higher wages, 
payments for classes, and lost revenue. There appears to be a substantial increase in the density 
of firms within a few kilometers inside the border of the low-cost state.  
I use a Density Manipulation Test (DMT) to formally test if the changes in the density of 
firms over the low- and high-cost states are not random in nature. Table 11 presents the 
manipulation test statistics for various buffer zone sizes. I find that we are able to reject the null 
hypothesis that no discontinuities exist in the density of firms at the state cutoff with significant 
confidence. For example, the robust bias-corrected test statistic, using a polynomial of degree 1, 
a triangular kernel, and jack-knifed standard errors for the 10-kilometer buffer zone is -7.0679 
and the p-value is 0.0000. These selections of kernel shape and standard error clustering are 
default procedures in the literature. I also perform the DMT limited to firms within 5- and 2.5-
kilometers of state boundaries and find no difference in significance or direction. The magnitude, 
direction, and significance for these results are consistent using a polynomial of order 2. Since it 
cannot be determined that these firm density patterns are arbitrarily assigned, I then analyze how 
differences in occupational licensing costs over state lines influences the probability of firm 
entry onto specific sides of the border.  
Table 5 presents the results of the four logistical regression model specifications, which 
measures the marginal effects of independent variable changes on the probability of a firm 
entering on Side 2 of a pair of bordered states. The assignment of Side 1 and Side 2 is discussed 
in the methodology section. This table only considers firms located within 10-kilometers of state 
borders, since they have similar geographic, consumer, and natural resource features at this 
distance.  
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Column (1) represents the simplest estimation, containing only the marginal effects of the 
two main variables of interest on the probability of a new firm entering from Side 2 of the 
market. I find a negative and statistically significant coefficient of -0.0003 for the cross-
differenced days required. This means that for every 33 additional days required for education 
and experience training on Side 2 of the border relative to Side 1, there is a 1% decrease in the 
probability that a new firm will enter into the state with the more expensive occupational 
licensing costs. Though a 1% decrease seems small in size, there are 20,993 firms located within 
10-kilometers of a state border, so a 1 percentage point decrease in the probability of electing to 
start a business in a state relative to the adjacent state can potentially affect hundreds of 
businesses and millions of dollars of tax revenue. This could lead to substantial losses in state tax 
revenue. I also find a significant negative coefficient estimate of -0.6617 for the indicator if the 
average fees are greater than $100 from the border pair, which implies that if a state has 
substantially higher fees than the bordering states firms are less likely to enter on that side. 
Since the firms are observed over a geographic longitude and latitude space Column (2) 
clusters the standard errors in bins of distance from the state border and finds almost identical 
trends in terms of magnitude and direction, though the marginal effect for the cross-differenced 
days required and average fees. Column (3) includes a variety of cross-border differenced control 
variables. Column (4) includes a variety of firm-specific variables regarding business structure.  
The direction, and significance of the marginal effect of the cross-difference days required on 
firm entry probability are consistent, though the magnitude of the coefficient estimate is smaller 
at -0.0001. When controlling for additional cross-border attributes, the magnitude of the 
coefficient estimate for cross-difference average fees becomes much smaller, ranging from -
0.0154 to -0.0149. This shows that a border side having average monetary fees greater than their 
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adjacent state by over $100 is associated with a 1.49% decrease in the likelihood a firm will enter 
the market there.  
Table 6 considers firms located with a 5-kilometer buffer zone of a state border, and 
Table 7 likewise conducts a similar analysis at a 2.5-kilometer buffer. Table 6 shows the 
marginal effects of an additional day in the cross-difference between the two sides of the border 
being correlated with a -0.0005 change in the probability of locating on Side 2 of the border in 
the basic model and -0.0001 in the most restrictive model with clustered errors, firm-specific 
variables, and cross-border controls. These effects are larger than at the 10-kilometer buffer 
zone, which supports the argument that these influences may be larger on the probability of entry 
for firms located closer to adjacent states. Within Table 7, I continue to find evidence of this 
negative and statistically significant trend of days required on the probability of firm location 
entry decisions. I also find significant negative coefficient estimates for average fees, ranging 
from -0.6037 in the base model and -0.0180 in the most restrictive model. It is important to note 
though that the magnitude of these probability changes is not consistent for all industries.  
Table 8 explores potential differences in the correlation of occupational licensing costs 
and firm entry for various major industry classifications within a 10-kilometer buffer zone. These 
models are structured with the same control variable set at Model (3) in Tables 5-7. I find 
negative and significant marginal effects of additional days required on Side 2 relative to Side 1 
for all industries. The correlations vary in magnitude from -0.0001 for most industries, to -0.0002 
for Construction, Manufacturing, and Wholesale Distribution. These industries with the larger 
coefficient estimate tend to be labor intensive and are associated with more well-known 
occupational license requirements. The average fees variable is also significant and negative 
across all specifications, and ranges in magnitude from -0.0105 to -0.0267. Tables 9 and 10 
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repeat these industry specific models for the 5- and 2.5-kilometer border zones, respectively. 
These additional specifications maintain similar results in terms of magnitude, significance, and 
direction.  
Since the data is cross-sectional the results presented are meant only to be correlative, 
rather than make any causal claims. I find, using the DMT, that these firm location patterns 
around state borders are not arbitrary, and instead manipulated by entrants. Using a series of 
logistic regressions, I determine that there are significant negative marginal effects for both extra 
days required and a cross-border difference in monetary fees of greater than $100 in the firm 
entry decision for Side 2. This means that when a state becomes more expensive relative to their 
adjacent state, firms are less likely to locate on the more expensive side of the border. These 
effects differ by industry and have larger magnitudes of marginal effects for firms in labor-
intensive industries.  
5.2 Firm Employment 
In addition to firm entry decisions, I am also concerned with the employment practices of 
firms. For example, it would make little empirical difference if we had twice the number of 
firms, but those firms only had half the number of employees each. Therefore, both parts of the 
system must be analyzed. I use a Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design (GRDD) to 
determine if there is a systematic difference in average employment near state borders between 
high- and low-cost states. This model is conducted with the assumption that when considering 
areas within small buffer zones around state borders that both sides of the border have similar 
populations of potential workers regarding density, education, and output quality. I also make the 
assumption that since these firms near state borders often make up a very small fraction of the 
total firms within a state, that they are not endogenously driving current occupational cost 
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decisions at the state level. I believe these assumptions to be appropriate for considering the 
average number of workers per firm within small bins of distance on either side of the border, 
which abstracts away from the density of firms and employees.  
Tables 12, 13, and 14 present the GRDD point estimates of the difference in employment 
trends at the border, when approaching over physical distance from the low-cost state on the left, 
and from the high-cost state on the right. Table 12 shows the estimates at the 10-kilometer buffer 
zone. Column (1) is the basic GRDD point estimation for linear functions using a triangular 
kernel structure, bin width determined by minimizing the mean squared error, and standard 
errors clustered along the running variable. The running variable in geographic regression 
discontinuity design framework is distance in the longitude and latitude space. Column (2) 
clusters the standard errors by the nearest neighbors along the running variable, by state. Column 
(3) allows for the non-linearity of the regressions on either side of the border by allowing 
polynomials of degree order 2. When analyzing changes in the average employee at 10-
kilometers of distance, I find small and insignificant differences between the predicted border 
point estimates.  
Table 13 limits the GRDD model to firms within a 5-kilometer buffer zone around the 
shared state borders. This specification may be more appropriate when analyzing border 
differences in average employment because occupational licensing cost effects may be larger for 
firms with less distance to an adjacent state. As with the 10-kilometer buffer, Column (1) 
presents the base specification, Column (2) clusters the standard errors by the nearest neighbor 
along the running variable by state, and Column (3) allows for non-linearity of the regressions by 
allowing for higher order polynomials. In this specification I find that all models for the 5-
kilometer border have significant, and negative, point estimation differences at the state border. 
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The point estimation in the base model is -2.3421, indicating that there are approximately 2.3 
fewer employees at a firm in the high-cost states relative to the low-cost states at the 
discontinuity. I likewise find a point estimation of -2.2896 in Column (2) and -2.4453 in Column 
(3). These results indicate that there are substantial firm average employment differences when 
considering firms within 5-kilometers of the state border. 
The models are repeated for a 2.5-kilometer buffer zone in Table 14. I find similar 
negative regression discontinuity point estimations, though not significant in Column (3) when 
allowing for non-linearity of the regressions. Using this model and the limiting assumptions on 
the employee populations, there are potential concerns that these observations may be biased or 
influenced by other policies. To provide additional insight into the determinants of these 
employment differences, I conduct a comparative analysis on pairs of related industries who 
differ in their occupational licensing requirements. These industry pairs are described in Section 
3.3. I conduct a series of Non-Temporal Difference-in-Difference (DD) models to compare 
licensed and unlicensed industries over state borders. The purpose of this analysis in conjunction 
with the GRDD is to determine if there are substantial differences in how licensed versus 
unlicensed firms differ in employment across high- and low-cost states. 
Table 15 conducts the DD analysis for all firms found across the six matched industry 
pairs. The models for the six different match types are presented in Tables 16 – 21. These results 
present three model specifications at the 20-, 10-, 5-, and 2.5-kilometer buffer zones. High Side 
and Licensed Industry represent indicator variables equal to 1 if the firm is located on the costlier 
side of the border pair and if they are part of a generally licensed industry, respectively. These 
coefficients do not provide much analytical insight, as they just account for differences within 
the industry and firm pair subsets. The variable of interest is the interaction term (H*OL), which 
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is equal to 1 if the firm is both located on the costly side of the border and is a licensed industry, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Model Specifications (1) in Table 15 represents the baseline specification where only the 
three variables of interest are regressed against the number of individuals a firm has employed. 
Within this specification ‘high side’ is determined by whichever side of the border has a longer 
amount of days required. Column (2) is the same specification but the standard errors are 
clustered over bins of distance, as is common practice with geographic models in the longitude-
latitude space. Column (3) also includes additional cross-differenced control variables.  
I find that for the total firm model in Table 15 that the interaction term (H*OL) is 
consistently negative for all specifications and buffer zone distances. This coefficient represents 
a negative effect on firm employment for licensed firms in high costs states that is not accounted 
for by differences in the border sides or differences between industries. Though the interaction 
term is not always significant, this may be due to an imprecise selection of controls. It is 
important to observe that the magnitude of this interaction effect in the total firms case is larger 
when considering firms in smaller buffer zones, in all specifications. For example, the most 
restrictive model presented in Column (3) has a negative interaction coefficient of -1.8648 when 
considering all firms within 20-kilometers of a state border. This means that licensed firms in 
high cost states typically have 1.9 fewer employees, even when accounting for industry and 
border differences. When considering only firms within 10-kilometers of the state border this 
interaction term increases in magnitude to -1.5785 and increases further to -3.9741 and -3.8537 
for firms located within 5- and 2.5-kilometers of a state border, respectively. 
The DD analysis is also conducted for the six match type pairs individually. These 
matches are pairs of industries that conduct similar functions within the economy but differ in 
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that one is often subject to occupational licensing for their workers while the other is not. 
Though these pairs of industries are similar, they are not perfect substitutes for one another and 
the analysis is meant to evaluate the validity of a possible interaction but not to make exhaustive 
causal claims. Table 16 compares the differences over borders for transportation industries, 
Match Type (1), with the licensed industry being Taxi Services (NAICS 485310) and the 
unlicensed industry being Other Transit and Ground Passenger Transit (NAICS 485999). When 
conducting the regression for this pair we find consistent, yet insignificant, interaction effects at 
20-, 5-, and 2.5 kilometers. These effects become larger when analyzing subsets of firms closer 
to the border. These results, while they are not perfect specifications, support the possibility that 
there is an additional negative effect on employment for firms who are often subject to 
occupational licensing in high cost states. In Table 17 I find similar negative interaction terms for 
Match Type (2), Architecture and Design, that are also increasing in magnitude at smaller buffer 
sizes. Table 18, Match Type (3), comparing Building Repair industries has a negative coefficient 
at 20- and 10-kilometers, which becomes positive at 5 kilometers, and then negative again at the 
2.5 kilometer buffer zone.  
Table 19, Match Type (4), Healthcare Assistance, is the one subset group which does not 
exhibit these negative coefficients. Instead it finds a positive interaction term for typically 
licensed firms on the side of the border where employees lose more days of work to education 
and experience training. It is unknown if this feature is exclusive to the healthcare assistance 
industries, which may have greater benefits to continuing education requirements for employees 
than other industries, possibly due to fast pace changes in medical research. Table 20, Match 
Type (5), comparing Landscaping Industries and Table 21 Match Type (6), Lending, both exhibit 
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a negative coefficient on employment for being a licensed industry firm in a costlier state relative 
to the adjacent state.  
The DD models provide support that, though it is not perfectly specified or significant, 
there exists a potential negative effect on employment for licensed industries in states with a high 
cost of days required of education and experience training relative to an adjacent state. This 
relationship persists, even when accounting for differences in the states and changes in 
employment for unlicensed industries. This result is reinforced by the GRDD point estimations 
of the average employee difference for the 10-, 5-, and 2.5-kilometer buffer zones. In summary, I 
find evidence of a negative impact on firm employment in high-cost states relative to adjacent 
low-cost states for firms near state borders. 
6. Conclusion 
In this study I analyze how occupational licensing costs impact firm entry and 
employment decisions near state borders. Although, there has been significant research on 
product quality and consumer behavior in response to occupational licensing costs, no studies to 
my knowledge have attempted to determine how these costs affect firms in the latitudinal and 
longitudinal space over adjacent states. My improved web scraped data set of specific firm 
location information allows regression models to be conducted at finer levels of geography. With 
this sample, I am able to predict both changes to probability of firm entry location as well as 
changes in average firm employment.  
I find that increasing the days required for education and experience training relative to 
an adjacent state or having average monetary fees greater than the adjacent state by over $100 is 
correlated with a decrease in the probability of a firm entering the market on that side of the state 
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border. These changes in probability are larger for labor-intensive and heavily regulated 
industries such as Construction, Manufacturing, and Wholesale Distribution.  
I find that when considering firms within a 5- or 2.5-kilometer buffer zone around a 
shared state boundary that there is a negative discontinuity point estimation between the low-cost 
and high-cost states in average firm employment. Meaning that there is a significant difference in 
the expected average number of employees at the state border between low- and high-cost state 
pairs, and that high cost states have less expected employees than low cost states. To substantiate 
the validity of these observations, I compare the average firm employment of pairs of similar 
licensed and unlicensed industries over state borders. I observe a negative effect in the 
interaction of being a licensed industry and residing in a high-cost state on the number of 
employees a firm has on their payroll, that is not accounted for through other channels.  
These findings have several implications for policy makers. With a growing percentage 
of the U.S. workforce requiring an occupational license, understanding the implications of these 
policies on firm outcomes are crucial for fostering business and economic growth. My results 
suggest that states can attract new businesses and improve overall employment through small 
changes in cost requirements for occupational licenses relative to adjacent states, which can lead 
to increases in local and state tax revenue. While my findings have limitations due to the cross-
sectional nature of the data, this study serves as an exploratory introduction into to the influence 
of occupational licensing costs on firms. 
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Chapter 2: Gender Bias within African Entrepreneurial Finance 
1. Introduction 
According to the 2015 World Bank Report, 10% of the world’s population lives on less 
than $1.90 a day. Over half of these impoverished individuals live in Africa. To promote long-
term economic growth, a crucial factor can be a society’s propensity to incorporate new firms 
and jobs through entrepreneurship. The ability to succeed in entrepreneurial ventures is often 
dependent on the entrepreneur’s access to initial financial capital, which is markedly difficult for 
women in countries throughout Africa. Women reported facing substantially higher barriers to 
entry, higher interest rates, and lack of local project support due to their gender. This paper seeks 
to analyze potential evidence of gender related biases in equity, debt, and philanthropic 
contribution financing practices and provide policy recommendations for improving female 
access to start-up funding for entrepreneurial ventures in Africa.  
Entrepreneurship has been identified as a critical component for explaining wealth 
concentration and introducing social mobility into a society (Quadrini 2000). In developing 
countries, entrepreneurship often serves a means of job creation, reducing income inequality, and 
contributing to economic growth (Ayyagari et al. 2014; Desai et al. 2013; Acs and Szerb 2007; 
Kimhi 2010). Though entrepreneurship has predominantly been a male dominated activity, 
female entrepreneurship is becoming increasingly more prevalent and recognized for its 
important impact (De Vita et al. 2014). Unfortunately, research of female African 
entrepreneurship has not been forthcoming due to data constraints. Though there are studies that 
find evidence of a gender bias in lending practices and difficulties in the process of developing 
female-led businesses, these studies are often limited to late-stage or established firms, small 
sample sizes, case studies, or only one geographic region.  
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The purpose of this study is to investigate potential gender bias in access to financial 
sources for early-stage African entrepreneurs. Using data from 2,812 entrepreneurs collected 
through the Entrepreneur Database Program at Emory University, I estimate the effects of gender 
on the initial decision to fund a project and the magnitude of funding received once a decision 
has been made to fund a project through the use of equity, debt, or philanthropic contribution 
financing. First, I estimate gender bias in the probability of being approved for funding. I then 
estimate the effect of gender differences in the amount of funding an approved project receives 
utilizing ordinary least squares. There is concern about a potential bias in how entrepreneurial 
projects are chosen for funding which may result in the women selected for funding being higher 
in the performance distribution than their male counterparts. To account for this, I also estimate 
the effects of gender using a two-stage Heckman estimation to correct for potential selection 
bias. This empirical method allows for the effects of gender on the magnitude of project funding 
to be moderated by incorporating the estimated probability of getting funding to condition the 
amount of funding instead of conditioning on the biased selection, which extends the results to 
be represented of the full sample of entrepreneurs regardless of funding approval status.  
This study utilizes new data, to overcome some limitations faced by previous researchers, 
provided through the Entrepreneurship Database Program at Emory University to develop one of 
the first cross-country analysis of the gender bias in financing trends for early-stage African 
entrepreneurs.  This study provides crucial insight into the African financial environment which 
can guide public policy and financial aid initiatives encouraging economic growth and gender 
equality.  
I find that early-stage African entrepreneurial firms with a female primary founder are 
less likely to receive equity and debt financing, even when utilizing a rich set of project and 
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industry controls. Not only are these female-led firms less likely to be funded but when 
approved, the amount of total finance provided tends to be smaller than similar male-led firms. 
Female-led entrepreneurial ventures also often face higher interest rates on loans and more 
restrictive loan repayment schedules. In contrast, I do not find evidence of a gender bias in the 
access or amount of philanthropic contribution funding for early-stage entrepreneurial businesses 
with a female primary founder. When utilizing the Heckman Selection Model, to correct for 
potential bias in the initial financing decision, I find that there is a negative effect of having a 
female primary founder on the selection for equity financing but not the amount the venture 
attracts. Within debt financing I find significant and large negative effects of female 
entrepreneurship in the selection and the total amount of debt funding a firm acquires which are 
larger than in the individual estimations. Finally, similar to the individual estimations, the 
Heckman Selection Model fails to find evidence of a significant gender bias in philanthropic 
contribution funding.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant literature. 
Section 3 provides details on the data used. Section 4 develops the utilized empirical models. 
Section 5 discusses the results of the models. Section 6 concludes and provides public policy 
recommendations.  
2. Literature Review 
Entrepreneurship is often defined as the activity of setting up a business or businesses and 
taking on financial risk in the expectation of a future return. These returns are typically in the 
form of expected profits but can also be social returns as well, where the firm has little to no 
financial profit motives. Using various data sources, Quadrini (2000) finds that entrepreneurship 
is critical for explaining wealth concentration and introducing social mobility. In developing 
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countries, small entrepreneurial firms have the largest share of job creation, highest sales and 
employment growth, and can be desirable for quickly rehabilitating conflict areas (Ayyagari et 
al. 2014; Desai et al. 2013). Therefore, focusing on policies that can reform the ease of doing 
business and limiting entry regulations is an important determinant in forecasting future growth 
in developing nations and economies (Acs and Szerb 2007). In African countries, primarily 
Ethiopia, Kimhi (2010) finds a uniform increase in entrepreneurial income reduces per capita 
household income inequality. This ability to utilize entrepreneurial ventures to stimulate growth 
also can serve as an avenue for gender equality. The Female Entrepreneurship Index (2015) finds 
that women who own and operate businesses significantly improve their economic welfare 
outcomes, and tend to be innovative, market expanding, and export-oriented which leads to 
overall economic growth at the country levels.  
This study presents a comparison of gender bias in entrepreneurial financial access across 
six African nations: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. These 
countries represent various geographic and government features but share commonalities in their 
political and economic growth history. These six countries were all under British Rule during the 
colonization period. South Africa was the first to gain independence from Britain in 1931. The 
other five nations gained their independence as sovereign nations between March 6th, 1957 and 
April 26th, 1964. In the early 1960’s these countries tended to be poor, pre-capitalist, and the 
production sector was primarily comprised of peasant agriculture using low-levels of technology 
(Ndulu and O’Connell 1999).  
Since the British parliament pulled out of Africa abruptly after India declared 
independence, a well-defined government structure had not been established for the transition. 
By the mid-1970s nearly every country in Africa had abandoned pluralistic political structures 
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for authoritarian regimes (only five countries maintained multi-party systems, but none of these 
are examined within this study). Bratton and van de Walle (1997) categorize the African nations 
into four political authoritarian structures:  military oligarchies, plebiscitary one-party systems, 
competitive one-party systems, and settler oligarchies. By 1975, within the six countries of 
interest Ghana, Uganda, and Nigeria developed into Military Oligarchies; Kenya and Tanzania 
had developed competitive one-party systems (open elections, but the primary authoritarian 
candidate won on average 93% of the vote); and South Africa had become a settler oligarchy 
(transition to black majority had not yet occurred). Despite the similar backgrounds of these 
countries, growth patterns began to diverge in the late 1980s to early 1990s along political 
subsets as these authoritarian governments shifted towards democracy. Important 
macroeconomic differences that emerged include wealth-inequality, ease of doing business, 
compliance to taxation law, and other factors that may have an impact of entrepreneurship that 
need to be explored further to understand how policies in these areas are affecting small-business 
ventures (Ali, Fjeldstad, Sjursen 2014). 
Unfortunately, research on African entrepreneurship has been subject to data related 
constraints. Due to the high cost of developing novel data, most studies are often limited to a 
single country or a prohibitively small sample size. Though there is a significant body of 
literature on entrepreneurial choice and motivations, this literature has primarily been developed 
using data for OECD nations and therefore is not appropriate for explaining entrepreneurial 
choice and growth implications in post-authoritarian developing countries. Tomnic and Rebernik 
(2007) find when studying small entrepreneurial ventures in post-communist Eastern European 
countries that there are a variety of differences in the motivations and impact factors of 
businesses in alternative political cultures. Benzing and Chu (2009) used a Likert-style 
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questionnaire to elicit the start-up motivations of entrepreneurs in Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria. 
They find that the strongest motivator across countries for entering entrepreneurship was the 
opportunity to increase income. They also found that entrepreneurs in Ghana have a strong 
motivation for providing stability for family, and female entrepreneurs are less motivated to 
create a business as a legacy or for external validation reasons. These results imply that there 
may be an important need for country and gender related policies in Africa when trying to 
develop environments that foster entrepreneurial access and growth. These target impact areas 
can be utilized to determine if a business may be growth- or independence-oriented, which is 
useful in policy research because this understanding can allow for policies to be directed towards 
ventures that sustain long-term economic growth and development and not the ventures that are 
created as a means of supplementing income (Douglas 2013). 
Though entrepreneurship has predominantly been a male dominated activity, the 
contributions of female entrepreneurship are becoming increasingly more prevalent and 
recognized (De Vita et al. 2014). As of 2010, approximately 42% of entrepreneurs world-wide 
were women and that number is steadily increasing (Kelley et al. 2010). Despite this, female 
entrepreneurs in Africa are often subject to disadvantages and cultural bias due to gender 
differences. Witbooi and Ukpere (2011) find that in South Africa, though women represent 52% 
of the population, they still suffer from historical and cultural prejudice in accessing 
opportunities. This can have negative effects on female entrepreneurial aspirations in terms of 
employment growth, even if their entry into entrepreneurship and self-employment is not directly 
affected (Acs et al. 2008). Likewise, a decomposition by Bonte and Piegeler (2013) find women 
are less competitively inclined than men and are less willing to take risks, and that these 
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differences in risk preferences contribute significantly to the gender gap in latent and nascent 
entrepreneurship.  
Bardasi et al. (2011) find that in sub-Saharan Africa there are significant gender gaps 
between male- and female-owned companies in terms of firm size and aspirations, but much 
smaller gaps in terms of firm efficiency and growth. Some researchers have attempted to explain 
this phenomenon through analysis of cultural norms. A study on female entrepreneurship in 
Kenya found that ethnic cultural influences play a large role in women’s propensity towards 
entrepreneurship but found little evidence of localized community perception bias (Mungai & 
Ogot 2012).  
Entrepreneurship serves as a source of economic empowerment for some African women. 
Female entrepreneurship participation is not only useful for personal development but has 
substantial impacts on the macroeconomic indices of their respective countries. Langevang and 
Gouch (2012) find that in sub-Saharan Africa shrinking public sectors and limited opportunity 
for formal employment in the private sector has led to an increase in youth selection into 
entrepreneurship. Similarly, Dzisi (2008) finds, through a survey of female entrepreneurs in 
Ghana, that through their entrepreneurial activity women were able to make substantial 
contributions to the economic growth of Ghana in terms of job creation, innovation, reduced 
poverty, and reduced unemployment rates. In a similar perspective, it can also be thought that 
growth-oriented firms are more likely to be invention based (Bettignies 2008). Robson et al. 
(2009) finds in a similar analysis of Ghana entrepreneurship, that the extent of the innovation 
improvements is related to firm size and education of the entrepreneur, which identifies the 
importance of providing access to capital and education resources for female entrepreneurs. 
Despite the measured improvements in macroeconomic factors, there is still a prevalent 
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productivity gap between firms with female versus male participation in ownership and decision 
making (Aterido and Hallward-Driemeier 2011).  
One of the reasons why we see a gap in the productivity or firm size of female-led 
entrepreneurial ventures could be a lack of access to capital resources. Though there have been 
previous studies of external factors and their influence on business development in Africa, the 
external environment is considered to be necessary but not sufficient for understanding or 
sustaining changes in entrepreneurial competencies and performance (Kiggundu 2002; Shane et 
al. 2003). Witbooi and Ukpere (2011) find presence of a gender gap between men and women in 
the access to financial services in South Africa that is often related to cultural or historical 
prejudice. There is evidence of these gender biases in finance existing regardless of project 
quality or long-term profitability measures (Hanson 2009). Chamlou (2008) finds that there is 
little difference between male and female-owned firms in North Africa, even if the cultural 
commonly held perception is that female led businesses are small and informal. They find that 
female owned firms in North Africa are well-established, productive, and just as connected to 
global markets as male-owned firms in the same region.  
Equity is one form of capital attainment for entrepreneurs. Equity can come from a 
variety of sources; including self-financing, angel investors, companies, government, venture 
capital, etc. Equity investment within the African continent is limited, and female founders often 
have a difficult time attracting outside investments. This trend seems counterintuitive because 
founding teams that include women are also more likely to hire employees within the first year, 
and to have earned prior revenues, which is a relationship that needs to be explored to understand 
gender diversity of African entrepreneurial ventures. Within the choice between equity 
investment, entrepreneurs must make decisions on types and amounts of equity investment they 
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need to start their ventures and to facilitate growth (Bettignies 2008). Other forms of financing 
utilized by some early-stage ventures include debt and philanthropic contributions. An 
interesting relationship for African firms that differs from many developed nations is there can 
be additional struggles to obtaining bank loans, and there are many non-government institutions 
that provide financial assistance to start-ups (Ali, Fjeldstad, Sjursen 2014). This study adds to the 
current literature by quantifying and understanding the relationship between early-stage African 
entrepreneurial venture finance and gender.  
3. Data Description 
3.1 Entrepreneurship Database Program at Emory University 
Data on early-stage entrepreneurial ventures was acquired through the Entrepreneurship 
Database Program at Emory University (EDP). The EDP leverages relationships with accelerator 
programs around the globe and has collected application information on 13,496 early-stage 
entrepreneurs within 178 countries from 2013 to 2017. This unique dataset provides, to my 
knowledge, the largest currently available collection of cross-country observations of early-stage 
African entrepreneurial ventures, including information on financing, industry, firm 
performance, and firm founder characteristics.  
These data were collected through a survey during the application process of an early-
stage firm attempting to participate in an accelerator program, which often provides various 
types of business training. A second survey was conducted six months after the initial application 
process, regardless of whether the entrepreneurial firm was selected to work with an accelerator 
program. Though the firms applying for participation in programs within accelerator programs 
may not be representative of the entire population of entrepreneurs, they are an important focus 
for policy recommendations as these are often some of the highest performance and social 
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impact firms within communities; and understanding how to provide a hospitable environment 
for these types of firms is important for overall economic growth.  
Within the EDP, there are firm-level observations for 2,812 firms operating in Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, South Africa, and Uganda that I use within my analysis. Table 25 
provides information on the number of observations and geographic location of each country. 
Table 28 provides founder gender statistics for the entrepreneurial businesses. 27.95% of the 
firms have a female primary founder, while 41.98% have at least one female founder. These 
firms are either a non-profit, for-profit, undecided, or other business classification. A breakdown 
of business classifications within my data set is provided in Table 23. Some of these firms have 
additional patents, copyrights, or trademarks which are shown in Table 24. 
Entrepreneurs in these analyses can obtain funding from three different sources: equity, 
debt, or philanthropic contribution. Equity financing is a type of funding provided to a company 
with the expectation of some ownership or share in the future of the enterprise. Equity financing 
in my sample can be received from many different places including angel investors, other 
companies, government, venture capital, or other sources. Currently, 11.1% of the firms in my 
sample have some form of equity financing from sources other than the entrepreneur’s personal 
funds. The mean amount of funds for a firm with equity financing is $20,852. Table 26 provides 
a breakdown of the equity sources utilized by firms within this survey.  
The second type of financing that entrepreneurs can utilize is debt funding. These are 
funds which have an expectation of repayment in the future. These are provided through formal 
banking systems, non-bank institutions, governments, companies, family members, or other 
individuals. Table 27 provides a breakdown of the debt financing sources utilized by firms 
within this survey. Within this sample, 13.7% of the entrepreneurs have some form of debt 
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financing, with a mean of $25,340. The final type of funding option is philanthropic contribution 
financing. This is obtained from a charity, foundation, grant, gift, or some other form of social 
enterprise finance. Philanthropic contributions are the most heavily utilized source of start-up 
capital with 29.2% of the entrepreneurs in the sample using this form of financing. The mean 
amount of philanthropic contribution funding is $24,204.  
3.2 Macroeconomic Indices 
 Early-stage venture environments are not only determined by demographic attributes; but 
can also be influenced by external macroeconomic factors such as policies, socioeconomic 
dynamics, or local cultural norms. These factors need to be accounted for when comparing 
entrepreneurial access to finances across countries. Table 29 provides summary statistics for 
many of the macroeconomic indices that will be considered in the analyses. These statistics were 
acquired through the World Bank and include information such as country, population, GDP per 
capita, the percentage of the population that lives in urban areas, GINI coefficients, Human 
Development Index (HDI), and the Ease of Doing Business (EDB).  
 As shown in Table 29, these countries are similar in their development scores but have a 
wide variety of levels of inequality. South Africa, considered by the World Bank to be the most 
developed of the African countries being considered, maintains the highest GINI coefficient at 
0.631, while Ghana and Tanzania have much lower levels of income inequality. All the countries 
in my sample have over half of their population living in urban areas, except for Uganda and 
Tanzania (both of these countries do also have large nomadic groups of indigenous people). The 
GDP per capita is highest in South Africa and lowest in Uganda. The GDP per capita in all of the 
countries within this sample are less than $6,000 annual in 2015 USD.  
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4. Empirical Methodology 
The financing process has two points where gender bias may be introduced: 1. at the 
initial decision to grant funding to an entrepreneur; and 2. within the decision of the amount of 
funding to provide. Since there are two points of potential gender bias in the finance decision, I 
first individually estimate the gender bias of these two points. I then utilize a two-stage Heckman 
Selection Model to account for selection bias to estimate the effects on the total funding amount. 
Finally, I compare the individual estimation and Heckman Selection Model to identify the range 
of possible funding bias.  
4.1 Individual Estimations 
To identify potential gender bias in African entrepreneurial finance I separately estimate 
the probability of an entrepreneur being approved for funding and the effect of characteristics on 
the amount of funding. To determine the probability of being approved for funding, I utilize a 
probit regression model for each of the three main categories of financing: equity, debt, and 
philanthropic contributions. This model determines if key characteristics affect the probability 
that an entrepreneurial venture gains access to funding. Using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression, I identify key characteristics determining the amount of funding a firm receives. 
4.1.1 Approval 
The following probit model is used to estimate the probability that a firm is approved for 
access to a funding source: 
Approvalict = α0 + α1Genderi + α2Agei + α3Agei2 + λXi + μc + γt + εict    (1) 
Where Approvalict is a binary variable equal to 1 if an entrepreneurial firm received funding from 
a given source, and 0 otherwise. Genderi is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s primary 
founder is female. Agei and Agei
2 represent age and age squared of the founder, respectively. Xi is 
a vector of additional characteristics of the firm and its primary founder such as education, 
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experience, industry, profit goals, profit margins, and presence of full-time and part-time 
employees. μc contains country fixed effects and macroeconomic indices. γt are application year 
fixed effects.  
4.1.2 Funding Amount 
The following regression estimates the relation between firm characteristics and the 
amount of funds granted to firms. It is important to note that the following regression is only for 
the sample of entrepreneurs who received funding and does not account for attributes of firms 
who were not selected. The following presents the structure of the OLS model:  
Fundict = β0 + β1Genderi + β2Agei + β3Agei2 + λXi + υc + γt + εict  (2) 
Where Fundsict equals the log of the total amount of funds a firm received. All other variables are 
the same as the previous model.  
The probit and OLS models in conjunction provide an analytical insight into the 
influences and gender bias in the access and magnitude of entrepreneurial finance. For the 
funding estimation to be true it requires the strong assumption that the selection of entrepreneurs 
across genders has similar performance distributions. Since I am concerned about possible 
gender bias in the selection process of entrepreneurial financial access it may not be the case that 
the funded female entrepreneurs are selected using similar criteria to their male entrepreneur 
counterparts. If only the top female entrepreneurs are selected the estimated results may not be 
applicable to all entrepreneurs. To address this concern is why I also utilize a Heckman Selection 
Model. 
4.2 Heckman Selection Model 
The Heckman Selection Model estimates the underlying relation of the firm 
characteristics and funding amount in the absence of a selection bias. The possible selection bias 
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is that due to harsher cutoffs for funding decisions for females there is a possibility that only the 
better performing females may be selected. This reduces the magnitude of the individual funding 
difference between genders that we observe within the total funding amount of all firms. The 
Heckman Selection Model considers the attributes of all entrepreneurs, regardless of if they are 
selected for funding, to determine how characteristics affect the total amount of funding awarded 
without the presence of bias.  
The Heckman Selection Model is conducted by first determining the probability of being 
selected, and then using information provided from the first stage to predict how the 
characteristics affect the total amount of funding in the second stage. A key difference between 
estimating the two decisions individually as above and in this two-stage procedure is the 
inclusion of an additional variable that only predicts magnitude of funding through predicting 
selection probability, commonly called an exclusion variable. This exclusion variable will only 
be included in the first stage of the Heckman Selection Model. Each of the funding categories 
have different aspects of their market that are predictive of selection, but not funding. To make 
the exclusion variables I took the mean of the characteristics appearing in the pool of funding 
applicants to represent the level of competition faced by the applicant for receiving funding. 
Since each type of funding has different economic determinants, these mean characteristics differ 
by funding type. For equity the exclusion variable is the mean number of other applicants 
holding patents, for debt it is the mean number of other applicants holding trademarks, and 
finally for philanthropic contributions the exclusion variable is the mean age of the other 
applicants.  
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The first-stage of the Heckman Selection Model is visually similar to the probit model 
detailed above in equation (1). Unlike the above probit regression, I am estimating the latent 
propensity of being selected for funding, Approval*ict.  
Approval*ict = α0 + α1Genderi + α2Agei + α3Agei2 + η + λXi + μc + γt + εict    (3) 
Where most of the characteristics are defined the same as in equation (1), there is now the 
additional exclusion variable η, as discussed above. The observed realization of Approvalict* is a 
binary variable representing that the applicant received funding and is observed with a positive 
amount of funding.  
The second stage involves estimating the magnitude of funding conditional on being 
funded. Approval = 1 if Approval* ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise. Equation (3) is estimated using a probit 
regression and the inverse mills ratio is generated. The second stage includes the inverse mills 
ratio as an additional regressor within an OLS regression model. Equation (2) is then modified to 
the following:  
Fund*ict|Approval = 
 β0 + β1Genderi +β2IMRi + β3Agei + β4Agei2 + λXi + υc + γt + εict  (4) 
Where IMRi is the inverse mills ratio, which accounts for the correlations of errors in 
equations (1) and (3). From this specification, we can determine if factors that make selection 
less likely, in this case having an entrepreneurial venture with a female primary founder, are 
associated with a difference in the magnitude of funds received from a financing source. If these 
results are identical to the previous method, then there is no selection differences present based 
on a gender bias. If the results are different, then they present a complimentary range of the 
effects of the gender of the primary founder on the amount of funding.  
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Individual Estimations 
Tables 30, 31, and 32 present the probit estimates for equity, debt, and philanthropic 
contribution financing, respectively. Each table represents the probability of a firm being 
selected for that type of funding. Column (1) presents the least restrictive specification which 
accounts for only founder gender and age. Column (2) also controls for founder education and 
experience. Column (3) is the most restrictive model and further includes founder profit goals 
and social motivations, as well as service or product information.  
 Across all equity and debt specifications there is a statistically significant negative effect 
on funding probability of having a female primary founder. This association ranges from a 
28.90% to a 23.33% reduction in the probability for equity and a 14.34% to 16.15% decrease for 
debt funding. For equity, there is a negative association of an additional year of age, though this 
association is positive in the squared term which implies that this decrease happens at an 
increasing rate at higher ages within the range of ages present within the dataset. However, for 
debt, I find a positive effect of age on the probability of funding, which is expected since credit 
worthiness and history often increase with age. The squared term implies that this increase in the 
probability of receiving funding at older ages does decrease marginally over time within the 
range of ages in this dataset.  In the third specification, I also find that the probability of 
receiving equity or debt funding increases if the firm has established profit goals or is holding a 
legal trademark. For equity the probability of funding also increases if the product is invention 
based, and the firm holds patents. 
The most commonly utilized external source of funding by African entrepreneurial 
ventures are philanthropic contributions, which also ostensibly have a different selection 
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decision. They have the highest approval rates for applicants, and many contributors 
purposefully promote fairness in their funding choices.  There is no significant effect of having a 
female primary founder of the entrepreneurial venture, but it is interesting that, unlike equity and 
debt financing, the estimated effect is positive. Age also has no significant effect, though the 
estimates imply that the funding probability may be lower for older entrepreneurs. 
Bias may not only exist in the initial funding decision, but in the amount of funding that 
is provided to a firm. Tables 33, 34, and 35 present the results for the OLS regressions on the 
logged amount of equity, debt, and philanthropic contribution funding, respectively. This 
analysis only includes firms that were approved for and received a positive amount of funding. 
The three specifications control for firm and founder characteristics in the same way as the above 
probit models. For equity financing specifications (2) and (3), I find a large and negative effect 
of having a female primary founder on the magnitude of equity funding. This negative effect is 
present and significant for all debt specifications. In conjunction with the probit regression, this 
implies that there is some amount of negative effect of having a female founder on both the 
ability to gain funding and the amount of funding received even when accounting for differences 
in profit goals, experience, education, and attributes of the good or service. For both equity and 
debt, I find a positive effect of age on the magnitude of funding, though the squared term for 
equity implies that this increase is at a decreasing rate in higher ages. The equity results are 
counter to the selection estimation while both of the debt results are in line with each other in 
terms of the effect of age. For equity this implies that an older founder may decrease the 
probability of receiving funding, but older primary founders attract larger amounts if funding is 
received. There is also a significant and large increase in the magnitude of received funding for 
firms with established profit goals, and a large negative decrease in the magnitude of funds 
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received by firms with socially motivated projects. There are no other statistically significant 
predictors for debt funding magnitudes. However, the effect is negative for invention-based 
firms, and those with patents or copyrights. This may signal reluctance of debt financing sources 
to fund untested products. Which is different from equity financers who often prefer new 
products and services.  
 There does not appear to be a significant effect of founder gender on the philanthropic 
contribution magnitude. Even though the gender effects are not significant, they are positive 
implying there may be some active decision to give larger amounts of funding to female led 
companies. There exists a positive correlation between age and funding amount received, though 
the squared term implies that this positive effect lessens for older founders. There also appears to 
be a slight, yet significant, relation between the funding amounts and the founder having 
previous for-profit work experience. There also is a positive and significant effect of having 
trademarked brands, products, or services. 
5.2 Heckman Selection Model 
The potential issue with the two individual estimations is that selection bias in the initial 
financing decision may cause the pool of funded female applicants to be unrepresentative of the 
total pool of female applicants. Selection bias could cause the associations between founder 
characteristics with funding magnitude to be inaccurate or misleading. To address this concern, I 
utilize a two-stage Heckman Selection Model. This model allows for information regarding the 
entire pool of applicants and the selection decision to be considered when analyzing the amount 
of funding, rather than just those funded. In the models, the first stage representing the initial 
selection decision requires the inclusion of an additional variable that is not included in the 
magnitude estimation, this additional variable is referred to as an exclusion restriction. Since the 
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decision for each funding type is different, the exclusion restrictions are also different. For 
equity, the exclusion restriction is the percent of applicants within the same country, application 
year, and industry that hold a patent. For debt, it is the percent of applicants within the same 
country, application year, and industry that hold a trademark. Lastly, for philanthropy, it is the 
average age of the other applicants in the same country, application year, and industry.  
The Heckman Selection model results are reported in Tables 36, 37, and 38. Columns (1), 
(2), and (3) are specified as above except that I remove patents, copyrights, and trademarks from 
specification (3). For all three funding sources, the exclusion restriction is a highly significant 
predictor of the selection decision, though occasionally is weaker in the third specification. I find 
that equity funding magnitudes are not significantly related with founder gender and that the 
effects are much smaller than they were in the prior estimations. For debt, a female founder still 
has a significant negative relation ranging from -0.833 to -0.9643 which is larger than the above 
results. Age has a significant, positive effect on the amount of equity and debt funding a firm 
receives, with estimates for equity ranging from 0.1753 to 0.2415. In the third specification, 
there is also a strong, negative effect of having social motives on the amount of equity funding a 
firm receives. There is a weak positive effect of for-profit work experience on debt funding 
magnitudes, and a weakly negative effect of not-for-profit work experience. The equity results 
indicate that gender related bias is present in the initial financing decision, but not in the amount 
of funding a firm acquires once it has been selected. While the Heckman results for debt support 
there is gender bias in both decisions and that the total funding bias was masked by the selection 
bias previously. 
I find that having a female primary founder is associated with an insignificant positive 
effect on the amount of philanthropic contribution funding a firm is provided, even after 
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correcting for potential selection bias in projects. The only variable that makes a sizable and 
significant difference in the amount of funding is the age of the firm founder. These results 
suggest that philanthropic contribution financing may not incur a gender bias in either the initial 
financing decision or the subsequent decision over the amount of philanthropic contribution 
funding.  
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper seeks to investigate potential gender biases in the access to financial sources 
for early-stage African entrepreneurs. I do this by applying two analytical techniques to data 
from the Entrepreneurship Database Project at Emory University. The first analytical technique 
is to individually estimate the two possible biased decisions of a firm being selected for funding 
utilizing a probit regression and the amount of funding that the selected firm receives using an 
OLS model. Since I am concerned about potential selection bias the second technique, I utilize a 
two-stage Heckman Selection Model which allows the effects on the amount of funding to 
consider attributes of the entire set of entrepreneurs and not just the ones selected for funding.  
These models are conducted for the selection and total amount of funding decisions for 
three different types of funding sources: equity, debt, and philanthropic contributions. For equity 
funding, I find, in the individual estimation, evidence of there being a significant negative effect 
of a female primary founder on both the probability of receiving funding and on the total amount 
of funding. After incorporating corrections for possible selection bias using the Heckman 
Selection Model, I find there is consistent evidence of a sizable negative effect of having a 
female primary founder on the probability of being selected for funding, but that gender is not a 
significant determinant of the amount of equity funding a firm receives after selection and that 
estimations of this effect are smaller than in the individual estimations. Within debt financing 
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decisions I first find evidence from the individual estimations that there is a negative effect of 
having a female primary founder on both the selection procedure and the amount of money 
provided to the entrepreneurial firm. After correcting for the initial potential bias, I find evidence 
that gender is a significant determinant in both the probability of being selected for funding and 
in the total amount of debt funding a firm receives. These estimations are much larger in the 
Heckman Selection Model than in the individual estimations. Finally, in the philanthropic 
contribution selection and awarded amount decisions there appears to be no significant gender 
effect in either the individual estimations or the Heckman Selection Model.  
In response to these results, I believe there are important policy recommendations that 
can be made for African countries that are wanting to encourage female entrepreneurship with 
the intent of encouraging economic growth and prosperity. First, policy makers should seek to 
encourage policy that actively promotes equality in investment practices in both selection and 
investment decisions. This could involve incentive programs, networking and promotional 
support for female-led start-ups, or government programs requiring the initial equity financing 
decisions by public enterprises to be determined by project performance projections. Within debt 
lending practices, African policy makers can focus on policies which would encourage 
application decisions to be made on project quality instead of gender. These policies can include 
equal ability for women to hold property or other equity that can be used as collateral for a loan 
and policies which would require non-predatory interest rate lending based on gender. Finally, 
philanthropic contribution financing presents an interesting and unique option for encouraging 
equality in financing practices. Many philanthropic organizations prioritize making selection 
decisions based upon project impacts in the community and not on the gender of the 
entrepreneurial venture founder. Policies that would encourage more philanthropic contribution 
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financing options can provide a crucial means for access to start-up finance for women 
entrepreneurs.  
This study does have some theoretical, empirical, and practical limitations that need to be 
addressed. First, the data collected by the Entrepreneurship Database Program at Emory 
University is collected on entrepreneurs who have ever applied to participate in an accelerator 
program. Though this is the most extensive currently available dataset, to my knowledge, of 
early-stage African entrepreneurs it may not be representative of all existing entrepreneurs. This 
empirical analysis would also benefit from a wider variety of information on the distinct 
attributes of the entrepreneurs, ventures, and local communities. Since these are anonymized 
questionnaire responses, I am unable to contact the original participants to gather further 
information. Finally, future research into this area would be advised from these results to address 
potential selection bias in their assessment of entrepreneurial finance, especially where there are 
limited samples sizes.  
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Chapter 3: Unintended Consequences of BAPCPA: Small Business Entry and Exit 
Behavior 
1. Introduction 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), 
was implemented into The United States Bankruptcy Code fourteen years ago, since then, the 
needs of bankruptcy filers have drastically changed. Over this period average household debt has 
increased, the methods by which debt is accumulated has changed, and tens of thousands of filers 
that could benefit from bankruptcy are unable to afford the fees to start the filing process. In 
April of 2019, the nonpartisan American Bankruptcy Institute which consists of 13,000 judges, 
attorneys, and other professionals offered a 278-page report from the Commission on Consumer 
Bankruptcy to Congress regarding proposed changes for the consumer bankruptcy system to 
reflect these changing economic dynamics. In the wake of this proposed bankruptcy regulation 
overhaul, I aim to explore how the last amendment, BAPCPA, affected the entry and exit rates of 
small businesses in order to structure policy recommendations for potential future amendments 
in order to minimize deterrence of small business ownership.  
The implementation of BAPCPA had many unexpected consequences such as instigating 
a rush on bankruptcy filings, practitioners electing away from specializing in bankruptcy law, 
and debtors having reduced access to unsecured debt with a higher risk of experiencing financial 
distress more than 10 years after filing (Borgo 2019; Bak et al. 2008; Eisler 2006; Han & Li 
2011). One group that is often overlooked when analyzing consumer bankruptcy protection is 
small businesses. Approximately 11% of U.S. households have at least one self-employed 
individual and 17% of personal bankruptcy filings in the U.S. include some amount of business 
debt (White 2006; White 2011). Since most small businesses and self-employed individuals are 
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unincorporated, and therefore are not financially separate entities from their businesses, the 
ability to file for bankruptcy often serves as a form of wealth protection when there is market 
uncertainty (Lawless 2007, Lawless 2019). Understanding how BAPCPA has affected the entry 
and exit rates of small businesses will provide insight into the short-term effects of bankruptcy 
amendments. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine if BAPCPA disproportionately affected the 
entry and exit rates of small businesses. To do this I compare the opening and closure rates of 
small versus large firms prior to the approval of BAPCPA and the years following BAPCPA’s 
implementation using a Difference-in-Difference empirical approach. To determine the 
differences between states that already maintaining high and low personal homestead exemptions 
levels for consumer bankruptcy during the BAPCPA implementation, I employ a Triple-
Difference method. All analyses are conducted for the sample of all firms, as well as by each 
major industry subsector. 
This paper contributes to the current literature by furthering the understanding of how the 
implementation of BAPCPA affected the entry and exit behavior of firms by size and industry. In 
particular, examining individual entry and exit behavior by industries in this context, to my 
knowledge, has not currently been addressed in the literature. Doing so helps circumvent the 
generalities of the policy effect on all businesses which through aggregation may conceal key 
effects. This research also addresses the current debate on how differences in state-level 
homestead exemptions affect business reactions to bankruptcy policy shocks. In this paper, I 
intend to expand the knowledge regarding the effects of bankruptcy amendments to improve 
future policy changes to manage and minimize potential shocks of bankruptcy amendments on 
small businesses.  
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I find the implementation of BAPCPA decreased the percentage of all small firms 
entering the market relative to primarily unaffected large firms by between 4.91% and 5.11%. 
This relationship varies greatly by industry, varying from positive effects on entry rates to large 
entry rate decreases. The effect of BAPCPA on exit rates is far less ambiguous, with an increase 
in the relative exit rates of small firms of approximately 2.15% to 2.74%. This effect is highly 
persistent across industries as the effects direction was the same across all industries and 
statistically significant for 15 of 20 studied industries which was masked in the total firm results. 
Despite the aforementioned concerns, this study fails to find evidence of small firm entry rate 
differences in the policy effect between low and high personal homestead exemption states, 
though there are significant exit rate differences. The exit rate effects varied greatly between 
industries, ranging from positive to negative exit rate effects when accounting for additional 
treatment variables representing homestead exemption levels.   
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant literature. 
Section 3 details the data that will be used for analysis. Section 4 develops the empirical 
methodology and specifications. Section 5 presents the empirical results of the models. Section 6 
concludes and discusses policy recommendations.  
2. Literature Review 
Bankruptcy protection was first utilized in the U.S. during the early 1800s as a way for 
fur traders to recover from losses stemming from extreme weather conditions. Since then, 
bankruptcy law has drastically changed and expanded to keep up with policy needs. Though 
bankruptcy existed in various forms during the 19th and 20th centuries, the most expansive piece 
of legislation, which is considered the beginning of modern bankruptcy laws, is The Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978. This act was the first comprehensive federal reform of bankruptcy practices 
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and provided a structure for multiple forms of debt forgiveness, individual readjustments, and 
liquidation practices. This act merged and reorganized Chapter X and Chapter XI into the new 
Chapter 11 form of bankruptcy. It also sought to encourage greater use of Chapter 7 and Chapter 
13 bankruptcy, while also maintaining that the individual states have the right to select their own 
personal exemption levels. The Bankruptcy Code was subject to major amendment changes in 
both 1994 and 2005 with the most recent amendment being titled the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). The purpose of BAPCPA was to 
make filing under Chapter 7 bankruptcy more difficult to avoid bankruptcy abuse and fraud 
while simultaneously encouraging debtors into restructuring rather than liquidation of their debts 
(Bak et al. 2008; Howard 2005). The most notable BAPCPA changes included incorporating a 
means test for income levels to determine if Chapter 7 is the appropriate bankruptcy form, a 
mandatory waiting period between filings, credit counseling and debtor education requirements, 
and a system of checks and limits of offloaded assets in the months prior to filing (Eisler 2006; 
White 2007).  
BAPCPA had a variety of both expected and unexpected consequences for debtors, 
lenders, and the macroeconomy (Borgo 2019). In the two months prior to BAPCPA being 
implemented, there was an unprecedented 550,000 bankruptcy filings, which quickly fell to 
record lows of roughly 20,000 filings in the six-weeks after implementation (Bak et al. 2008). In 
the years following the initial decrease, personal bankruptcy filing rates crept back up over time 
and by 2008 leveled-out at 61% of the pre-BAPCPA filing levels, though these changes in filing 
rates do vary greatly by region (Flynn & Crewson 2008). Also, post-BAPCPA there has been a 
large increase in the number of cases that are identified and dismissed as abusive (Spurr & Ball 
2013). In these years after the policy implementation, there has been an increase in the cost of 
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consumer bankruptcy filings and it has been observed that qualified practitioners are electing 
away from practicing bankruptcy law (Eisler 2006). Debtors often have more limited access to 
unsecured debt after filing and have been found to still experience financial distress even more 
than 10 years after filing (Han & Li 2011). Total debt for the average filer has increased, as has 
reliance on credit cards at the financial expense of credit users, divorce rates, prime and 
subprime mortgage default rates, foreclosure rates, and revolving debt usage per household even 
after accounting for the recent financial crisis (Price & Dalton 2007; Simkovic 2009; Traczynski 
2011; Li et al. 2011; White 2007; Mitman 2016).  
Small business owners are an important group to focus on when determining the effects 
of bankruptcy law changes on economic welfare. Self-employment and small business ownership 
can be inherently risky and have high failure rates, especially in recessions or periods of 
macroeconomic hardship. U.S. bankruptcy law attempts to make self-employment and 
entrepreneurship more attractive for individuals by providing a form of partial wealth insurance 
in the event of a business failure. Approximately 11% of U.S. households have at least one self-
employed worker and 17% of all personal bankruptcy filings in the U.S. include business debt 
which suggests the importance of bankruptcy for small businesses (White 2006). Since most 
small businesses and self-employed individuals are unincorporated, and therefore are not a 
financially separate entity from their business, Chapter 7 is the most commonly utilized form of 
bankruptcy by small, entrepreneurial business owners (Fan & White 2003). Since these small 
businesses are often unincorporated it also means that their ability to access credit based on their 
personal financial stability is crucial, which is often hindered by bankruptcy filing status 
(Berkowitz & White 2004; Han & Li 2011). Personal bankruptcy provides two types of essential 
wealth protection, first, over future assets with the discharge of debt obligations, and second, 
 61 
over current assets with personal exemptions (White 2001). This relationship between small 
business owners and personal bankruptcy means that the introduction of BAPCPA may have 
disproportionately affected individuals who owned or were considering starting a business since 
the availability of Chapter 7 utilization became significantly more restrictive under the federal 
amendment.  
Large firms who utilize Chapter 11 bankruptcy are not immune to the effects of 
BAPCPA. Teloni (2015) finds BAPCPA is associated with decreases in Chapter 11 case duration 
and an increased number of firms that refile for bankruptcy. This means that in the time since the 
amendment changes many debtors quickly emerge from the bankruptcy process having not 
achieved rehabilitation even though credit counseling and debtor education was a main goal of 
the BAPCPA changes. Cerqueiro et al. (2019) finds when studying business dynamism, that 
debtor protection can increase firm exit and destruction rates for both large and small firms. They 
also find evidence of lenient personal bankruptcy laws being associated with increases in firm 
entry only for sectors requiring low start-up capital. The entry and exit rates of firms can be 
highly variable by industry, size, and the value of necessary capital for business operation 
(Dunne & Samuelson 1988). Lawless (2007) ascertains that many of the statues within BAPCPA 
were not developed or written to include considerations for business owners, which could 
disproportionately hurt small businesses relative to large businesses since many small firms are 
unincorporated and therefore the business owners would be faced with personal liability for 
business debts in the event of business failure.  Small businesses are common in all industries, 
but these businesses often have shorter life expectancies than their larger counterparts (Geroski 
1995; Hopenhayn 1992). Rohlin and Ross (2014), examined business turnover rates of firms 
located near state borders, they found that entry decisions are also partially driven by differences 
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in wealth protection, and that increases in wealth protection, mainly through the homestead 
exemption, can both positively impact the entry of new firms and the longevity of existing firms.  
Homestead exemptions allow debtors to retain up to a set level of their accumulated 
wealth in the event of undue hardship, and in some states even allow individuals to retain their 
homes and other assets while their personal debts and obligations for repayment are discharged. 
For small business owners who are unincorporated, the largest wealth protection aspect of 
bankruptcy is the homestead exemption of Chapter 7, which varies greatly as they are set by the 
individual states. Overall, studies have found that having the option of bankruptcy is valuable to 
households, especially households with high variance in returns to their wealth in high 
exemption states (White 1998). These personal exemption levels are thought to reflect the 
relative cost of filing formal bankruptcy versus informal default (Lefgren & McIntyre 2009).  
Having the metaphorical safety net of personal bankruptcy in the event of business failure 
has many short and long-term effects on the choices and outcomes of self-employed individuals 
and small business owners. These effects can greatly differ based upon if the individual is 
located in a state with a high or low level of homestead exemptions. Fan and White (2003) find 
high bankruptcy exemption levels benefit potential entrepreneurs who are risk averse by 
providing partial wealth insurance, which directly increases the probability of these individuals 
electing into self-employment or starting a business venture. Primo and Green (2011) find areas 
with more generous personal exemptions are linked to having less productive “innovation” 
entrepreneurship and that though these favorable laws increase the level of self-employment, 
these effects are non-monotonic with the level of asset protection. Contrastingly, having the 
additional protection over personal assets from debt obligations causes credit suppliers to limit 
the amount of credit that they extend to self-employed individuals and small business owners. 
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Consequently, it has been found that higher personal exemption levels are associated with a 
higher likelihood of small business owners filing for bankruptcy (Berkowitz & White 2002; 
Agarwal et al. 2005). 
Since BAPCPA was implemented in 2005, some may question why analyzing this 
question is relevant to public policy in 2019. The short-term effects of BAPCPA were highly 
unexpected and volatile with a rush on bankruptcy filings and widespread mortgage defaults, as 
real estate is the most commonly used collateral for small business loans (Bak et al. 2008; 
Mitman 2016; Spurr & Ball 2013). Federal consumer bankruptcy restructuring has again become 
an important topic for legislatures as the needs of financially constrained consumers have 
changed; student loan debts have reached historical levels, the legal fees for initially filing 
bankruptcy have become too expensive for many households to afford, and crowdfunding 
personal and business ventures has become more commonplace. As previously mentioned, the 
Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy of the American Banking Institute released a final report 
to Congress detailing recommendations for their policy recommendations regarding the 
recommended legal changes for the next amendment to the Bankruptcy Act (Lawless 2019). As 
these changes are being discussed, I believe it is important to reflect on the short-term impact of 
previous sweeping Federal changes in order to recommend policy procedures for how future 
amendments can be written to minimize adverse impacts on individuals who utilize the 
bankruptcy system, starting with firm entry and exit behaviors.  
3. Data 
The entry and exit rates of firms are determined by matching and tracking unique firm 
identifier codes annually across historical individual establishment data collected through 
ReferenceUSA. A firm is considered to have exited if it was present in the current year data but 
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did not appear in the next year’s data. Similarly, a firm is considered to have entered if it 
appeared in the current year data but not in the prior year’s data. Information regarding the 
number of firms in each year of historical data and the percent of firms that are considered small, 
identified has having 20 or fewer employees, in this analysis are presented in Table 39. 
Additional information in the data includes firm location, number of employees, and primary six-
digit NAICS codes (used to determine a firm’s industry).  
 I also incorporate information on the consumer bankruptcy environment of each state. 
The largest exemption in consumer bankruptcy for a debtor is the personal exemption which 
differs across states. This is the amount of personal assets an individual or household can retain 
in the event of filing for personal bankruptcy. Since the business owner’s marital status is 
unknown, I utilize the exemption level for married individuals under the age of 65 for the years 
2004 and 2006 as the state personal exemption level. These homestead exemption levels were 
first found in Rohlin and Ross (2014) and then confirmed using Elias et al. (2011). The 
homestead exemption levels by state are provided in Table 40. For the main results, a state is 
considered to have a low exemption level if the homestead exemption was less than $50,000 in 
2006.  
4. Empirical Methodology 
Personal bankruptcy is a form of wealth protection for small, unincorporated business 
owners. When filing, debtors utilizing the bankruptcy system also often have accumulated 
business debt from failed ventures. Small businesses in the United States have inherent risk that 
may cause small business owners to choose not to enter a market or to prematurely exit a market 
if they expect that this form of wealth protection may be changed. 
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 To first analyze the effects of BAPCPA, I utilize a difference-in-difference regression 
model, which allows for the comparison of small and large firms before and after the treatment, 
or the implementation of BAPCPA, while differencing out time invariant heterogeneity. Due to 
the nature of the data and computational limitations, an examination at the firm level is 
infeasible; therefore the observations are at the industry-state-year level for the percentage of 
entry and exit of small and large firms. The model takes the following form:  
 
Entryst = α0 + β1Smalls + β2Postt + δ1(Small*Postst) + εst  (1) 
 
Where Entryst is the percentage of firms that entered the market in a given industry, state, and 
year. Smalls is equal to 1 if the dependent variable is for small firms. Postt is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if the observation is observed after the policy change. (Small*Post)st is a treatment 
variable equal to 1 if the observation is both for small firms and after the policy change. δ1 is the 
coefficient of interest as it explains the additional variation on the entry rates of small firms after 
BAPCPA that is not accounted for by the individual coefficient estimations. The specification is 
the same for exits with the appropriate outcome variable, Exitst.  
 Using the difference-in-difference methodology requires a strong assumption of common 
trends. Meaning, there is the required assumption that the entry and exit rates of small and large 
firms would have evolved similarly if not for the BAPCPA amendment being implemented. This 
assumption may not hold as variation in personal homestead exemptions by state affected the 
amount of personal liability some business owners face. Business owners in high exemption 
states may have been less likely to change their entry and exit patterns in response to an 
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upcoming federal change due to the large personal asset safety net already provided within their 
state.  
 To account for the concern that there may be differing reactions to BAPCPA based on 
level of state exemptions, I implement a Triple Differencing method, which allows the 
comparison of BAPCPA’s affects to also be between low and high exemption states. As with the 
difference-in-difference model the observations are at the industry-state-year level. The model 
takes the following form: 
 
Entryst = α0 + β1Smalls + β2Postt + β3Lows + δ1(Small*Post)st + δ2(Post*Low)st + 
δ3(Small*Low)s + λ1(Small*Post*Low)st + εst  (2) 
 
Where Entryst is the percentage of firms that entered the market. Smalls is a binary variable equal 
to 1 if the dependent variable is for small firms. Postt is equal to 1 if the observation is from the 
time period after the policy change. Lows is equal to 1 if the observation is from a low homestead 
exemption state. (Samll*Post)st is a treatment variable equal to 1 if the observation is for small 
firms after the policy change. (Post*Low)st is a treatment variable equal to 1 if the dependent 
variable is from a low exemption state and observed after the policy change. (Small*Low)s is 
equal to 1 if the observation is for small firms within a low homestead exemption state. λ1 is the 
coefficient of interest in the triple difference estimation which explains the additional variation 
of small firms after the policy change in low exemption states that are not explained by the 
individual coefficient estimates or the series of combined estimates. (Small*Post*Low)st is a 
treatment variable equal to 1 if the observation is for small firms in low exemption states after 
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the policy change. The specification is the same for exits with the appropriate outcome variable, 
Exitst. 
 Each sector in the economy may respond differently to policy changes. The effects of a 
bankruptcy reform act may not affect, for example, businesses in the agricultural sector in the 
same way that it affects the information sector. There are also sector specific trends over this 
time period that would cause both small and large firms to change entry and exit decisions in a 
way that may not be present in other sectors. Since these sector differences may persist, the 
difference-in-difference and triple difference models are also conducted for each individual two-
digit NAICS code classifications. The breakdown of industry subsectors by two-digit NAICS 
codes is listed in Table 41. 
5. Empirical Results 
 Table 42(43) presents the Difference-in-Difference entry(exit) results. Specification (1) 
contains no additional terms from equation (1). Specification (2) includes additional state-level 
fixed effects, while specification (3) further contains industry fixed effects. I find a persistent, 
statistically significant, negative treatment effect in all specifications. This means that there is a 
decrease of approximately 4.91% in the amount of small firms entering the market in the post-
BAPCPA period, even after accounting for the individual estimates for the policy effect and firm 
size. I find that there is a comparative increase of 2.74% in the amount of small firms exiting the 
markets in the post-policy period. In conjunction with the results for entries, this means that 
when considering the pool of all firms, there was an overall decrease in small firms due to 
increased short-run exit and decreased entry after the implementation of BAPCPA.  
However, not all industries are inherently identical and may have different behavior 
patterns after a policy shock. Table 46(47) displays the direction and significance for entry(exit) 
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by individual industries, defined by the 20 two-digit NAICS code subsectors, to allow for an 
understanding of potential heterogeneity of bankruptcy amendment policy effects. I find that the 
estimate of the treatment effect varies greatly across industries and does not maintain a cohesive 
pattern for the percentage of firms entering the market for entries, with seven having positive 
treatment effects, meaning an increase in firm entry was observed, and nine having negative 
treatment effects. This result is important because it shows that when BAPCPA was 
implemented not all industries were affected the same with some industries experiencing an 
increase in small business entry. There does not appear to be an obvious pattern regarding the 
directional effect by industries, as the industries divided by effect direction have a mix of start-up 
fund, capital, and labor requirements. Unlike the ambiguity with entry patterns, in nearly every 
industry there is a statistically significant positive increase to the percent of small firms exiting 
the market in the post-policy period that is unaccounted for in the individual coefficient 
estimates. Notable exceptions to this pattern are the five industries with insignificant treatment 
effects, and the significant decrease in Education Services exits in the post-BAPCPA period. In 
conjunction, the entry and exit results show that general flow of firms by industry is also 
heterogeneous. Overall, the industry results do highlight the importance of analyzing industries 
separately, especially the entry results, as the reactions to bankruptcy can be heterogeneous.  
 Since previous literature has found notable effects of homestead exemption levels on 
firm behavior, it is crucial to investigate if the effects of BAPCPA also vary by personal 
homestead exemption levels. It may be the case that individuals in states with large safety nets in 
the event of unincorporated, small business default may not have changed their entry and exit 
behavior in the same way as an individual in a state with a small safety net. To address this 
concern Table 44(45) presents the results for a Triple-Differenced regression on firms’ market 
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entry(exits). I do not find evidence of a significant difference in the effects of policy change on 
the rate of small business entry between high and low exemption states. With the inclusion of the 
interactions with exemption level, the treatment effect of the policy on entry is still a statistically 
significant decrease of 5.11%. Similar to the entry case, I fail to find evidence of a statistically 
significant difference in the effect of the BAPCPA implementation on small businesses in low 
exemption states, relative to high exemption states when considering the entire sample of firms. 
With the additional controls, the treatment effects are no longer significant; however the 
direction and magnitude of the treatment effect term is similar to the previous estimates, with a 
2.15% increase in exits. 
Table 48(49) presents the direction and significance for the Triple-Difference regressions 
on entry(exit) by industry. Again, there is no evidence of a statistically significant difference in 
the post-policy effects of small business entry between low and high exemption states that is not 
explained by the original treatment effect (Small*Post), and there are still mixed directional 
effects of the policy change. For exits however, the exemption level causes mixed results in the 
effect of the policy. There is a positive and significant interaction term in the Information sector, 
and positive insignificant estimates for 13 of the 19 remaining industries meaning there is an 
increased percentage of exits in low exemption states not explained by other interactions or 
controls, leaving three industries as having significantly negative triple difference treatment 
effect, and three industries as insignificantly negative. The negative Triple-Differenced 
interaction term means than low exemption states experienced a relative decrease in the 
percentage of small firms exiting the market in the post policy period. For exits, there is still a 
generally positive and statistically significant treatment effect of the post-policy period on small 
firms, but not all industries behave identically, with some now having significantly negative 
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policy treatments on exiting behavior. The exit rates of small firms between exemption levels 
over the whole time period vary widely relative to large firms, with eight industries having 
significant and negative coefficients, two being positive and significant, and 10 industries having 
insignificant estimates. 
It is interesting to note for entries that, though not statistically significant, the direction of 
the (Small*Post*Low) interaction terms in 15 of the 20 industries is negative. In the same 15 
industries there is a positive, yet insignificant, interaction of entry rates in low exemption states 
in the post-policy implementation period. These two results indicate that low exemption states 
may have greater firm entry in the post policy period compared to high exemption level states, 
but that the differences by firm size are ambiguous in direction.  
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
 This study analyzes the potential effects of BAPCPA on small business entry and exit 
behavior utilizing multiple empirical strategies. I find evidence of a significant decrease of 
approximately 4.91% on the aggregate entry of small businesses. This effect is ambiguous at the 
industry level, as individual industries vary substantially on percent of small businesses entering 
the market in the post-policy period, and these effects were negative just as often as positive. 
Though the industry level effects on entry are ambiguous, the relationship between BAPCPA and 
small business exit patterns is more salient. BAPCPA increased the percentage of small 
businesses exiting the market in the post-policy period by approximately 2.74%. 15 of the 20 
industries also show evidence of a similar increase in small business exit.  
 Utilizing a Triple-Differencing methodology, I fail to find significant evidence that the 
entry rates of small businesses in the post-implementation period of BAPCPA differed 
substantially between states with low or high homestead exemptions. When accounting for these 
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additional variables and potential interactions, small business entry by industry in the post-policy 
period is still ambiguous in direction. There is some evidence that there is a negative and 
statistically significant effect of low homestead exemptions interacting with the general 
treatment effect of the policy, with lower exits in low exemption states.  
 These results have important implications for structuring future policy. First, 
policymakers should realize that consumer bankruptcy changes may have unintended 
consequences on small business owners with varying affects by industry. Therefore, when 
designing future bankruptcy amendments there needs to be considerations in the 
disproportionately high number of bankruptcy filers that have business related debts. Second, 
studies should be conducted identifying at risk industries and designing relief strategies to 
minimize harm for current and potential business owners. Finally, the approval and 
implementation of BAPCPA happened in an abnormally short period of time, which could have 
caused additional effects due to uncertainty for businesses. In future policy, I recommend either a 
larger implementation time period to avoid another bankruptcy filing rush or to have the 
amendment changes implemented in stages.  
 There are limitations of this study that should be acknowledge to improve future research. 
First, though this novel dataset is robust, publicly available data is not able to identify the 
incorporation status or self-employment status of each firm, only if the firm is public, private, or 
a branch location. This public data is also unable to determine if a business owner has filed for 
bankruptcy or is financially insolvent. Future research would benefit from government’ business 
and individual tax records. This project is also currently restricted by limits in computational 
resources for using individual firm-level data across time, and instead had to be aggregated to the 
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state-level, losing much of the rich empirical rigor that would be available with specific business 
attributes.   
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Appendix A 
 
There are 109 different state border pairs, (including a few that consist of a single point, such as 
Georgia-North Carolina). For the empirical results I conduct this analysis on buffer zones of 10-, 
5-, and 1-kilometer sizes. First, I use geographic information systems (GIS) to overlay my cross-
sectional firm location data from April 2017 onto detailed state maps. I use the longitude and 
latitude for the location of each firm, to determine both the firm’s exact location on a map and its 
distance from other geographic features. I identify the shortest possible distance from each firm 
to its closest state border containing two or more states. I then use GIS to draw buffer zone 
around state borders and identify each firm that falls within particular ranges of distance. For 
graphical illustration, Figure 2. shows a map of the 299,746 businesses that started their business 
within a 10-kilometer buffer of a state border pair. Figure 3. provides a zoomed-in look at a 
selection of states.  
Figure 2: Map of Firm Locations within 10-km of a State Border Pair 
299,746 businesses located with a 10-km buffer zone of state borders in April 2017
 
Figure 3: Zoomed-In Map of Firm Locations within 10-km of a Border Pair 
Zoomed in representation of the firms located within a 10-km buffer zone of state borders in 
April 2017 
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Appendix B 
 
Figure 4. Density of Firms around Border 
 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics  
 Industry Number 
Observations 
Percent 
Dataset 
1 Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry, and Mining 102,124 3.22% 
2 Construction 313,058 9.86% 
3 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 328,292 10.34% 
4 Manufacturing 83,957 2.64% 
5 Public Administration 19,188 0.60% 
6 Retail Trade 600,313 18.91% 
7 Services 1.460,624 46.01% 
8 Transport 158,026 4.98% 
9 Wholesale Distribution 109,088 3.44% 
 Total 3,174,670 100% 
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Table 2. Match Industry Pairs 
 Match Type Generally Licensed 
Employees 
Generally Unlicensed 
Employees 
1 Transportation Taxi Services Other Transit & Ground 
Passenger transport 
2 Architecture & Design Architecture Services Other Specialized Design 
Services 
3 Building Repair Residential Remodelers Other Personal & Household 
Good Repair and Maintenance 
4 Healthcare Assistance Other Miscellaneous Health 
Practitioners 
Other Personal Services 
 
5 Landscaping Landscaping Services Nursery, Garden Center, and 
Farm Supply Stores 
6 Lending Commercial Banking Consumer Lending 
 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics of State Variables  
Variable Mean Min Max Standard 
Deviation 
Average Fees $268.14 $76.00 $704.00 $113.77 
Days Required 373.69 117.2 987.7 199.54 
State Tax Rate 5.11% 0% 7.25% 1.96% 
Average Local 
Tax 
1.36% -0.03% 5.01% 1.50% 
Minimum Wage $8.32 $7.25 $11.50 $1.22 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Rate 
62.25% 52.09% 69.55% 4.08% 
Unemployment 
Rate 
4.23% 2.5% 6.3% 0.87% 
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics of Cross-Differenced State Variables 
Cross-
Differenced 
Mean Min Max Standard 
Deviation  
Average Fees $91.92 $1.00 $540.00 $87.94 
Days Required 168.86 8.3 550.7 124.59 
State Tax Rate 5.22% 0.04% 7.25% 1.70% 
Average Local 
Tax 
1.49% 0.00% 5.01% 1.53% 
Minimum Wage $1.00 $0.00 $4.25 $0.94 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Rate 
3.35% 0.01% 14.13% 2.67% 
Unemployment 
Rate 
0.79% 0.00% 3.70% 0.62% 
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Table 5. Logit Function for Days Required within 10-km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cross-Differenced 
Days Required  
 
-0.0003*** 
(4.61e-06) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001*** 
(1.42e-06) 
-0.0001*** 
(3.54e-05) 
Cross-Differenced 
Average Fees 
Greater than $100 
 
-0.6617*** 
(0.0032) 
 
-0.6622*** 
(0.0150) 
-0.0154*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0149*** 
(0.0007) 
Cross-Differenced 
Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
 
 
 
 
 0.0877*** 
(0.0165) 
0.0939*** 
(0.0119) 
Cross-Differenced 
Minimum Wage 
Over $1 
 
 
 
 
 0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
Cross-Differenced 
State Tax Rate 
 
 
 
 -0.0034*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0033*** 
(0.0002) 
Cross-Differenced 
Local Tax Rate 
 
 
 
 -0.0044*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0045*** 
(0.0002) 
Cross-Differenced 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
 
 -0.0001 
(0.0007) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
Firm or Individual 
 
 
 
 
  -0.0034*** 
(0.0005) 
Home Business 
 
 
 
 
  -0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
Private Company   
 
 
  -0.0011 
(0.0007) 
Single Location  
 
 
  -0.0020*** 
(0.0008) 
Headquarter  
 
 
  -0.0002 
(0.0009) 
Branch    -0.0013 
(0.0008) 
 
Number Obs. 299,746 297,897 297,897 297,897 
Clustered SE No Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.137 0.137 0.993 0.993 
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Table 6. Logit Function for Days Required within 5-km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cross-Differenced 
Days Required 
 
-0.0005*** 
(6.38e-06) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001*** 
(2.13e-06) 
-0.0001*** 
(2.02e-06) 
Cross-Differenced 
Average Fees 
Greater than $100 
 
-0.6037*** 
(0.0049) 
 
-0.6044*** 
(0.0320) 
-0.0191*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0180*** 
(0.0009) 
Cross-Differenced 
Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
 
 
 
 
 0.0545*** 
(0.0196) 
0.0671*** 
(0.0201) 
Cross-Differenced 
Minimum Wage 
Over $1 
 
 
 
 
 -0.0001 
(0.0007) 
-0.0001 
(0.0007) 
Cross-Differenced 
State Tax Rate 
 
 
 
 -0.0044*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0003) 
Cross-Differenced 
Local Tax Rate 
 
 
 
 -0.0045*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0047*** 
(0.0008) 
Cross-Differenced 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
 
 -0.0016* 
(0.0009) 
-0.0008 
(0.0010) 
Firm or Individual 
 
 
 
 
  -0.0035*** 
(0.0007) 
Home Business 
 
 
 
 
  -0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
Private Company   
 
 
  -0.0005 
(0.0011) 
Single Location  
 
 
  -0.0039*** 
(0.0013) 
Headquarter  
 
 
  -0.0015 
(0.0016) 
Branch    -0.0024 
(0.0015) 
 
Number Obs. 160,281 158,432 158,432 158,432 
Clustered SE No Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.100 0.102 0.992 0.992 
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Table 7. Logit Function for Days Required within 2.5-km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cross-Differenced 
Days Required 
 
-0.0004*** 
(9.46e-06) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001*** 
(3.35e-06) 
-0.0001*** 
(3.30e-06) 
Cross-Differenced 
Average Fees 
Greater than $100 
 
-0.5152*** 
(0.0075) 
 
-0.5145*** 
(0.0398) 
-0.0194*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0190*** 
(0.0010) 
Cross-Differenced 
Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
 
 
 
 
 0.1027*** 
(0.0186) 
0.1078*** 
(0.0173) 
Cross-Differenced 
Minimum Wage 
Over $1 
 
 
 
 
 -0.0020** 
(0.0010) 
0.0016* 
(0.0010) 
Cross-Differenced 
State Tax Rate 
 
 
 
 -0.0046*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0045*** 
(0.0005) 
Cross-Differenced 
Local Tax Rate 
 
 
 
 -0.0070*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0066*** 
(0.0007) 
Cross-Differenced 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
 
 0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.0009* 
(0.0015) 
Firm or Individual 
 
 
 
 
  -0.0049*** 
(0.0011) 
Home Business 
 
 
 
 
  -0.0012*** 
(0.0003) 
Private Company   
 
 
  0.0005 
(0.0014) 
Single Location  
 
 
  -0.0084*** 
(0.0017) 
Headquarter  
 
 
  -0.0004 
(0.0017) 
Branch    -0.0061*** 
(0.0020) 
 
Number Obs. 160,281 158,432 158,432 158,432 
Clustered SE No Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.100 0.102 0.992 0.992 
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Table 8. Logit Function on Days Required within 10-kilometers of Border by Industry 
Industry Cross-
Differenced 
Days Required 
Cross-
Differenced 
Avg Fees > $100 
Observations R2 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing, Mining 
-0.0001*** 
(5.91e-06) 
-0.0267*** 
(0.0031) 
7,106 0.984 
Construction -0.0002*** 
(2.62e-05) 
-0.0190*** 
(0.0011) 
26,484 0.991 
Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 
-0.0001*** 
(1.77e-06) 
-0.0117*** 
(0.0007) 
33,880 0.993 
Manufacturing -0.0002*** 
(4.37e-06) 
-0.0239*** 
(0.0018) 
7,722 0.988 
Retail Trade -0.0001*** 
(1.48e-06) 
-0.0143*** 
(0.0008) 
59,638 0.993 
Services -0.0001*** 
(1.48e-06) 
-0.0133*** 
(0.0008) 
134,853 0.994 
Transportation -0.0001*** 
(3.14e-06) 
-0.0105*** 
(0.0018) 
15,778 0.995 
Wholesale 
Distribution 
-0.0002*** 
(3.15e-06) 
-0.0200*** 
(0.0031) 
10,325 0.990 
 
Table 9. Logit Function on Days Required within 5-kilometers of Border by Industry 
Industry Cross-
Differenced 
Days Required 
Cross-
Differenced 
Avg Fees > $100 
Observations R2 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing, Mining 
-0.0001*** 
(9.27e-06) 
-0.0306*** 
(0.0071) 
3,499 0.982 
Construction -0.0002*** 
(3.74e-05) 
-0.0255*** 
(0.0019) 
12,672 0.989 
Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 
-0.0001*** 
(2.15e-06) 
-0.0127*** 
(0.0012) 
18,593 0.993 
Manufacturing -0.0003*** 
(5.11e-06) 
-0.0251*** 
(0.0007) 
4,224 0.986 
Retail Trade -0.0001*** 
(2.25e-06) 
-0.0176*** 
(0.0008) 
32,889 0.992 
Services -0.0001*** 
(2.50e-06) 
-0.0168*** 
(0.0012) 
72,068 0.993 
Transportation -0.0001*** 
(3.31e-06) 
-0.0138*** 
(0.0017) 
7,704 0.992 
Wholesale 
Distribution 
-0.0002*** 
(5.07e-06) 
-0.0222*** 
(0.0040) 
5,533 0.992 
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Table 10. Logit Function on Days Required within 2.5-kilometers of Border by Industry  
Industry Cross-
Differenced 
Days Required 
Cross-
Differenced 
Avg Fees > $100 
Observations R2 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing, Mining 
-0.0001*** 
(1.89e-05) 
-0.0334*** 
(0.0048) 
1,578 0.976 
Construction -2.06e-05*** 
(5.06e-06) 
-0.0274*** 
(0.0019) 
5,575 0.988 
Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 
-1.48e-05*** 
(3.50e-06) 
-0.0135*** 
(0.0006) 
8,685 0.991 
Manufacturing -2.04e-05*** 
(5.96e-06) 
-0.0238*** 
(0.034) 
2,093 0.985 
Retail Trade -1.74e-05*** 
(3.20e-06) 
-0.0174*** 
(0.0011) 
15,916 0.990 
Services -1.59e-05*** 
(3.52e-06) 
-0.0170*** 
(0.0012) 
34,591 0.990 
Transportation -3.11e-05*** 
(4.40e-06) 
-0.0175*** 
(0.0020) 
3,468 0.988 
Wholesale 
Distribution 
-1.39e-05*** 
(4.95e-06) 
-0.0181*** 
(0.0025) 
2,665 0.991 
 
Table 11: Density Manipulation Test 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
10 kilometer 
(2) 
5 Kilometer 
(3) 
2.5 kilometer 
    
DMT Estimate -7.0679*** -3.5500*** -7.5861*** 
    
Observations 307,773 171.181 96,815 
Kernel Type Triangular Triangular Triangular 
Standard Error Jackknife Jackknife Jackknife 
Conventional p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Robust p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Order Loc. Poly. (p) 1 1 1 
Order Bias (q) 2 2 2 
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Table 12: GRDD: Employment within 10-kilometers of Border 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Employees 
(2) 
Employees 
(3) 
Employees 
    
RD Estimate 0.1360 -0.2569 -0.2540 
    
Observations 307,773 307,773 307,773 
Robust 95% CI [-1.49 ; 1.76] [-2.50 ; 1.98] [-2.71 ; 2.199] 
Kernel Type Triangular Triangular Triangular 
BW Type MSE-Optimal MSE-Optimal MSE-Optimal 
Cluster NN NNcluster(State) NNcluster(State) 
Conventional Std. Error 0.8294 1.1438 1.2517 
Conventional p-value 0.870 0.822 0.839 
Robust p-value 0.868 0.856 0.686 
Order Loc. Poly. (p) 1 1 2 
Order Bias (q) 2 2 3 
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 1.424 1.744 2.066 
BW Bias (b) 2.387 2.230 3.352 
 
Table 13: GRDD: Employment within 5-kilometers of Border  
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Employees 
(2) 
Employees 
(3) 
Employees 
    
RD Estimate -2.3421** -2.2869* -2.4453* 
    
Observations 171,181 171,181 171,181 
Robust 95% CI [-4.56 ; -0.12] [-4.72 ; 0.15] [-5.05 ; 0.15] 
Kernel Type Triangular Triangular Triangular 
BW Type MSE-Optimal MSE-Optimal MSE-Optimal 
Cluster NN NNcluster(State) NNcluster(State) 
Conventional Std. Error 1.1338 1.2439 1.3266 
Conventional p-value 0.039 0.066 0.065 
Robust p-value 0.020 0.023 0.027 
Order Loc. Poly. (p) 1 1 2 
Order Bias (q) 2 2 3 
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.632 0.597 0.870 
BW Bias (b) 1.460 1.358 1.676 
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Table 14: GRDD: Employment within 2.5-Kilometers of Border 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Employees 
(2) 
Employees 
(3) 
Employees 
    
RD Estimate -2.3498* -2.2002* -1.9815 
    
Observations 96,815 96,815 96,815 
Robust 95% CI [-4.85 ; 0.15] [-4.70 ; 0.30] [-4.95 ; 0.99] 
Kernel Type Triangular Triangular Triangular 
BW Type MSE-Optimal MSE-Optimal MSE-Optimal 
Cluster NN NNcluster(State) NNcluster(State) 
Conventional Std. Error 1.2774 1.276 1.5161 
Conventional p-value 0.066 0.085 0.191 
Robust p-value 0.109 0.125 0.345 
Order Loc. Poly. (p) 1 1 2 
Order Bias (q) 2 2 3 
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.482 0.521 0.517 
BW Bias (b) 0.799 0.755 1.745 
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Table 15. Difference-in-Difference for Firm-Industry Pairs: All Groups 
Variables 20-Kilometers 10-Kilometers 5-Kilometers 2.5-Kilometers 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
High Side 1.0954*** 
(0.3881) 
1.1017* 
(0.6033) 
1.9536* 
(0.7555) 
0.2335 
(0.5825) 
0.2393 
(0.9987) 
1.1401 
(1.2856) 
1.8128** 
(0.9211) 
1.8559 
(2.3178) 
3.4110 
(2.775) 
0.8777 
(1.7404) 
0.9681 
(3.7633) 
2.5075 
(4.0260) 
Licensed 
Industry 
1.235*** 
(0.3357) 
1.2410*** 
(0.4117) 
1.2292*** 
(0.4400) 
1.295*** 
(0.4771) 
1.3052** 
(0.6082) 
1.2800* 
(0.6686) 
1.4951** 
(0.6818) 
1.5141** 
(0.6873) 
1.4707* 
(0.7227) 
1.6309 
(1.2124) 
1.6691 
(1.2713) 
1.6670 
(1.3229) 
Interaction 
(H*OL) 
-1.5330*** 
(0.4521) 
-1.5409** 
(0.6888) 
-1.8648** 
(0.7339) 
-1.2364* 
(0.6830) 
-1.2474 
(1.1345) 
-1.5785 
(1.2191) 
-3.3269*** 
(1.0689) 
-3.3810 
(2.4782) 
-3.9741 
(2.6379) 
-3.2410* 
(2.0065) 
-3.3652 
(3.8180) 
-3.8537 
(3.8479) 
C-D Average 
Fees 
  0.3152 
(0.3762) 
  0.3127 
(0.6699) 
  -0.8461 
(0.7947) 
  -0.9961 
(0.9907) 
C-D Labor 
Force 
Participation 
Rate 
  -5.9883 
(4.6400) 
  -7.5076* 
(7.1467) 
  -12.2504 
(9.1745) 
  -14.4000 
(15.4972) 
C-D Minimum 
Wage > $1 
  0.9005** 
(0.3781) 
  1.0558* 
(0.4529) 
  1.3896* 
(0.7950) 
  2.1144 
(1.6537) 
C-D State Tax 
Rate 
  -0.0918*** 
(0.0313) 
  -0.686 
(0.0505) 
  -0.0986 
(0.0707) 
  -0.0651 
(0.1307) 
C-D Average 
Local Tax Rate 
  -0.0271 
(0.0617) 
  -0.0914 
(0.1144) 
  -0.1892 
(0.2295) 
  -0.2179 
(0.2697) 
C-D 
Unemployment 
Rate 
  -0.5091*** 
(0.1891) 
  -0.5370* 
(0.2937) 
  -0.5518 
(0.3856) 
  -0.8887 
(0.7358) 
Number Obs. 30,850 30,850 30,850 17,305 17,305 17,305 8,510 8,510 8,510 2,889 2,889 2,889 
Clustered SE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yea 
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.005 
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Table 16. Difference-in-Difference for Firm-Industry Pairs: Group Pair 1 
Variables 20-Kilometers 10-Kilometers 5-Kilometers 2.5-Kilometers 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
High Side 0.6931 
(0.5681) 
0.69957 
(1.1095) 
1.8418 
(1.5992) 
-0.7260 
(0.8616) 
-0.7216 
(1.4500) 
0.9629 
(2.9265) 
1.8951* 
(1.0748) 
1.9128 
(1.1683) 
-3.0662 
(2.9875) 
3.4736 
(2.5491) 
3.5715* 
(1.7887) 
-5.3979 
(3.7820) 
Licensed Industry -0.4966 
((0.7342) 
-0.4966 
(1.1777) 
1.8418 
(1.5992) 
-0.6488 
(1.0428) 
-0.6488 
(1.5107) 
-0.8534 
(1.4814) 
0.8862 
(1.1373) 
0.8862 
(1.7974) 
0.7092 
(1.6188) 
3.5059 
(2.3534) 
3.5059 
(4.0848) 
3.5969 
(3.2965) 
Interaction 
(H*OL) 
-1.2137 
(0.8289) 
-1.2177 
(1.3102) 
-0.7899 
(1.3478) 
0.7125 
(1.2484) 
0.7061 
(1.6808) 
1.1480 
(1.6583) 
-1.2800 
(1.5196) 
-1.3041 
(2.3125) 
-0.7337 
(2.1019) 
-6.8705* 
(3.6030) 
-7.0231 
(4.7092) 
-6.6446 
(3.5686) 
C-D Average Fees   0.0233 
(2.0042) 
  0.0820 
(3.1831) 
  -2.6953 
(1.7946) 
  -3.0037 
(3.3111) 
C-D Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
  -16.6735 
(29.2876) 
  -12.9585 
(49.2399) 
  9.6092 
(87.4050) 
  194.57 
(176.18) 
C-D Minimum 
Wage > $1 
  -1.8786 
(2.4864) 
  -2.1066 
(4.1862) 
  -10.3346** 
(4.1553) 
  -13.0086* 
(6.9866) 
C-D State Tax Rate   -0.5956** 
(0.4977) 
  -0.8341** 
(0.3744) 
  -0.6880*** 
(0.2278) 
  -0.8066** 
(0.3055) 
C-D Average Local 
Tax Rate 
  -0.5690 
(0.4977) 
  -0.8767 
(0.7942) 
  0.9704 
(0.8413) 
  2.4363** 
(0.9780) 
C-D Unemployment 
Rate 
  -0.6416 
(0.9448) 
  -0.8032 
(1.4282) 
  0.8573 
(0.6786) 
  -1.2404 
(1.1235) 
Number Obs. 4,715 4,715 4,715 2,591 2,591 2,591 948 948 948 293 293 293 
Clustered SE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R2 0.004 0.004 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.004 0.004 0.100 0.013 0.013 0.178 
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Table 17. Difference-in-Difference for Firm-Industry Pairs: Group Pair 2 
Variables 20-Kilometers 10-Kilometers 5-Kilometers 2.5-Kilometers 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
High Side -0.0012 
(1.2503) 
-0.0012 
(1.1224) 
-0.0226 
(1.1217) 
0.3852 
(1.9771) 
0.3852 
(1.0429) 
-0.1823 
(1.1498) 
1.6450 
(2.9823) 
1.6450 
(1.3064) 
1.4624 
(1.1620) 
1.4825 
(3.8188) 
1.4825 
(2.1672) 
1.8698 
(2.6397) 
Licensed 
Industry 
3.0292*** 
(0.9774) 
3.0317* 
(1.1426) 
2.5840** 
(1.2160) 
4.6102*** 
(1.3746) 
4.6166*** 
(0.8247) 
4.2934*** 
(0.7655) 
6.3225*** 
(2.1386) 
6.3386*** 
(0.7538) 
5.9775*** 
(0.8435) 
6.4701*** 
(2.3663) 
6.4979*** 
(0.8864) 
6.6281*** 
(1.1775) 
Interaction 
(H*OL) 
-0.9341 
(1.3922) 
-0.9348 
(1.5053) 
-0.6759 
(1.5183) 
-1.5803 
(2.1625) 
-1.5818 
(1.7795) 
-1.5099 
(1.6290) 
-4.5428 
(3.2578) 
-4.5521** 
(2.1020) 
-4.8964** 
(1.8278) 
-3.4109 
(4.1479 
-3.4114 
(3.3322) 
-5.0868 
(2.7945) 
C-D Average 
Fees 
  -0.5951 
(1.1235) 
  -0.0623 
(1.5344) 
  -1.3877 
(0.9301) 
  -1.0735 
(2.5363) 
C-D Labor 
Force 
Participation 
Rate 
  -25.9956** 
(10.6098 
  -33.0239** 
(15.3460) 
  -29.3019 
(18.2712) 
  -24.2005 
(24.6795) 
C-D Minimum 
Wage > $1 
  0.9930 
(0.7659) 
  0.6763 
(0.9312) 
  0.7889 
(1.2306) 
  -0.4300 
(1.8751) 
C-D State Tax 
Rate 
  0.0787 
(0.1097) 
  0.1510 
(0.1577) 
  0.1187 
(0.2295) 
  -0.0236 
(0.2395) 
C-D Average 
Local Tax 
Rate 
  -0.0643 
(0.1987) 
  -0.1696 
(0.3291) 
  -0.1624 
(0.3484) 
  0.0381 
(0.3961) 
C-D 
Unemploymen
t Rate 
  -1.0004 
(0.5870) 
  -1.1787 
(0.7356 
  -1.7183 
(1.0276) 
  -2.5841 
(1.9107) 
Number Obs. 1,969 1,969 1,969 ,1257 1,257 1,257 789 789 789 466 466 466 
Clustered SE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R2 0.009 0.009 0.019 0.013 0.013 0.026 0.018 0.018 0.036 0.021 0.021 0.047 
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Table 18. Difference-in-Difference for Firm-Industry Pairs: Group Pair 3 
Variables 20-Kilometers 10-Kilometers 5-Kilometers 2.5-Kilometers 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
High Side 0.6999 
(.04673) 
0.7057 
(0.7551) 
0.7304 
(0.7809) 
-0.2575 
(0.6865) 
-0.2314 
(0.8117) 
-0.2127 
(0.8679) 
-0.8654 
(1.1079) 
-0.8563 
(1.2757) 
*0.8241 
(1.4696) 
-1.4061 
(0.8564) 
-1.5313** 
(0.5781) 
-1.4061 
(0.8564) 
Licensed 
Industry 
0.0597 
(0.3556) 
0.0555 
(0.3573) 
0.0803 
(0.3605) 
-0.2273 
(0.5072) 
-0.2335 
(0.5847) 
-0.1746 
(0.5778) 
-0.320 
(0.7868) 
-0.3279 
(0.7971) 
-0.1843 
(0.7716) 
1.1774* 
(0.5502) 
0.9879 
(0.6335) 
1.1774* 
(0.5502) 
Interaction 
(H*OL) 
-1.2797** 
(0.5025) 
-1.2794* 
(0.7765) 
-1.3341* 
(0.7864) 
+0.3271 
(0.735) 
-0.3223 
(0.8674) 
-0.4010 
(.8646) 
0.3281 
(1.1904) 
0.3454 
(1.3198) 
0.0610 
(1.3459) 
-1.0177 
(1.2406) 
-0.3835 
(0.5757) 
-1.0177 
(1.2406) 
C-D Average 
Fees 
  0.0574 
(0.3878) 
  -0.7018 
(0.4457) 
  0.3848 
(1.0911) 
  -0.3688 
(1.0319) 
C-D Labor 
Force 
Participation 
Rate 
  -8.5552** 
(4.3413) 
  -11.7172** 
(4.6936) 
  -17.2931** 
(7.3227) 
  -17.9658 
(14.5860) 
C-D Minimum 
Wage > $1 
  0.0258 
(0.3219) 
  0.3188 
(0.5195) 
  -0.0133 
(0.7804) 
  0.3133 
(1.3918) 
C-D State Tax 
Rate 
  0.0220 
(0.0300) 
  0.0761 
(0.0563) 
  0.0429 
(0.0898) 
  0.1375 
(0.2088) 
C-D Average 
Local Tax Rate 
  -0.1314** 
(0.0643) 
  -0.1996** 
(0.0847) 
  -0.2039 
(0.1538) 
  -0.2727 
(0.3323) 
C-D 
Unemployment 
Rate 
  -0.1443 
(0.1763) 
  -0.1176 
(0.2841) 
  -0.1821 
(0.4827) 
  -0.4514 
(1.1804) 
Number Obs. 5,756 5,756 5,756 3,209 3,209 3,209 1,520 1,520 1,520 657 657 657 
Clustered SE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R2 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.018 
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Table 19. Difference-in-Difference for Firm-Industry Pairs: Group Pair 4 
Variables 20-Kilometers 10-Kilometers 5-Kilometers 2.5-Kilometers 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
High Side 0.2675 
(0.7339) 
0.2675 
(0.9719) 
1.1742 
(1.0134) 
0.834 
(0.9417) 
0.8385 
(1.5500) 
1.8687 
(1.5118) 
2.4237 
(1.6512) 
2.4627 
(3.3760) 
3.4525 
(3.0691) 
4.0645 
(3.3293) 
4.2080 
(7.1651) 
6.5381 
(6.1470) 
Licensed Industry 2.1283*** 
(0.7162) 
2.1286*** 
(0.6989) 
1.8314** 
(0.7488) 
1.2395 
(0.9334) 
1.2363** 
(0.5780) 
0.9463 
(0.8244) 
1.1121 
(1.5162) 
1.0966 
(1.0191) 
0.4278 
(1.2920) 
-0.5575 
(2.9643) 
-0.6534 
(1.5822) 
-1.694 
(2.2621) 
Interaction 
(H*OL) 
2.2627** 
(1.0813) 
2.2703 
(1.7072) 
2.3199 
(1.8677) 
3.9928*** 
(1.4593) 
4.0148 
(2.8728) 
3.8585 
(3.1879) 
2.6669 
(2.5751) 
2.7032 
(6.0801) 
2.1255 
(6.9274) 
8.2379 
(5.3871) 
8.5570 
(15.5368) 
7.9143 
(17.7067) 
C-D Average Fees   0.5449 
(1.5593) 
  0.8397 
(2.6348) 
  -3.0919 
(3.3106) 
  -4.0274 
(5.2724) 
C-D Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
  -19.2632 
(17.7267) 
  -29.1782 
(26.7935) 
  -43.2588 
(40.2505) 
  -35.3843 
(84.3196) 
C-D Minimum 
Wage > $1 
  2.5295 
(1.8077) 
  4.412 
(2.8498) 
  3.5913 
(4.0007) 
  6.9382 
(8.2404) 
C-D State Tax Rate   0.0364 
(0.1347) 
  0.1236 
(0.2386) 
  0.2528 
(0.4491) 
  0.2416 
(0.7284) 
C-D Average Local 
Tax Rate 
  -0.4158 
(0.2865 
  -0.4048 
(0.4623) 
  -0.6158 
(0.9899) 
  -0.7105 
(1.4925) 
C-D 
Unemployment 
Rate 
  -1.2553 
(1.0327) 
  -2.2713 
(1.4860) 
  -2.1389 
(2.2048) 
  -2.1310 
(3.9007) 
Number Obs. 3,696 3,696 3,696 2,283 2,283 2,283 1,550 1,550 1,550 536 536 536 
Clustered SE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R2 0.012 0.012 0.021 0.0157 0.016 0.035 0.010 0.010 0.031 0.019 0.020 0.041 
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Table 20. Difference-in-Difference for Firm-Industry Pairs: Group Pair 5 
Variables 20-Kilometers 10-Kilometers 5-Kilometers 2.5-Kilometers 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
High Side 3.4161*** 
(1.3314) 
3.4234 
(5.5100) 
3.9986 
(5.5342) 
5.5773** 
(2.3625) 
5.5652 
(11.2999) 
6.3575 
(11.3577) 
26.1280*** 
(3.5675) 
26.2214 
(23.9243) 
26.7246 
(23.8548) 
0.4799 
(1.2547) 
0.6498 
(1.8763) 
0.8558 
(1.7965) 
Licensed Industry -
2.8763*** 
(1.0129) 
-2.8668 
(2.7135) 
-2.7372 
(2.6568) 
-
4.7220*** 
(1.6982) 
-4.7279 
(4.7010) 
-4.5833 
(4.6482) 
-0.0924 
(2.4145) 
0.0104 
(0.5316) 
0.1945 
(0.5072) 
0.0189 
(0.8136) 
0.2165 
(0.8051) 
0.2766 
(0.8243) 
Interaction 
(H*OL) 
-
2.9474*** 
(1.3958) 
-2.9551 
(5.5260) 
3.1960 
(5.4544) 
-5.4128** 
(2.4743) 
-5.4040 
(11.3122) 
-5.6488 
(11.1603) 
-26.1339*** 
(3.7205) 
-26.2342 
(23.9066) 
26.1397 
(23.3838) 
-0.7406 
(1.3141) 
-0.9349 
(1.7226) 
-1.1297 
(1.7087) 
C-D Average 
Fees 
  -0.3654 
(0.5370) 
  -0.9818 
(0.9162) 
  -1.2623 
(1.5513) 
  0.3803 
(0.8073) 
C-D Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
  -12.7934* 
(6.7174) 
  -3.9196 
(10.6281) 
  5.4751 
(19.1167) 
  -14.4165* 
(7.6398) 
C-D Minimum 
Wage > $1 
  0.5776 
(0.6695) 
  0.7929 
(1.2201) 
  -0.2588 
(0.8475) 
  0.1401 
(0.8370) 
C-D State Tax 
Rate 
  -
0.1265*** 
(0.0362) 
  -
0.1235** 
(0.0583) 
  -
0.1268** 
(0.0546) 
  0.0675 
(0.0497) 
C-D Average 
Local Tax Rate 
  -0.0606 
(0.1460) 
  -0.1403 
(0.2712) 
  -0.5346 
(0.5511) 
  0.1018 
(0.0869) 
C-D 
Unemployment 
Rate 
  -0.7018** 
(0.3336) 
  -0.1923 
(0.4466) 
  0.4040 
(0.5691 
  -0.0338 
(0.2430) 
Number Obs. 6,746 6,746 6,746 3,541 3,541 3,541 1,707 1,707 1,707 776 776 776 
Clustered SE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R2 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.050 0.050 0.055 0.001 0.001 0.014 
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Table 21. Difference-in-Difference for Firm-Industry Pairs: Group Pair 6 
Variables 20-Kilometers 10-Kilometers 5-Kilometers 2.5-Kilometers 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
High Side -0.0886 
(1.2471) 
-0.0859 
(1.3760) 
0.9851 
(1.6782) 
-1.3772 
(1.8246) 
-1.3911 
(1.5725) 
-0.6478 
(2.1894) 
-1.9759 
(2.5341) 
-1.9906 
(2.6530) 
0.8573 
(3.7061) 
-1.7675 
(5.0190) 
-1.7236 
(5.4271) 
1.4133 
(8.5336) 
Licensed Industry 4.4844*** 
(-0.9113) 
4.4944*** 
(1.0962) 
5.0006*** 
(1.2271) 
5.2959*** 
(1.2519) 
5.3115*** 
(1.6630) 
5.6030*** 
(1.8219) 
3.9637** 
(1.6367) 
3.9653 
(2.3124) 
4.7788* 
(2.8341) 
4.9912 
(3.3351) 
4.9924 
(5.2083) 
5.5922 
(6.4752) 
Interaction 
(H*OL) 
-1.2596 
(1.4038) 
-1.2569 
(1.5907) 
-1.8429 
(1.7618) 
-1.8646 
(2.0737) 
-1.8483 
(1.9927) 
-2.1826 
(2.2413) 
-1.7243 
(2.9019) 
-1.7018 
(3.0856) 
-2.8292 
(3.6692) 
-4.0850 
(5.8481) 
-4.1282 
(6.5344) 
-5.0881 
(7.8315 
C-D Average Fees   1.3632 
(2.1731) 
  3.5367 
(3.9855) 
  -0.4191 
(1.7178) 
  -1.6964 
(4.1602) 
C-D Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
  17.9790 
(11.2438) 
  21.0807 
(17.1365) 
  19.3932 
(17.9039) 
  48.1173 
(42.6084) 
C-D Minimum 
Wage > $1 
  1.4538 
(1.0132) 
  1.0375 
(1.4566) 
  3.5883 
(2.2951) 
  3.0404 
(4.8665) 
C-D State Tax 
Rate 
  -0.1378** 
(0.0689) 
  -0.1113 
(0.1050) 
  -0.1437 
(0.1427) 
  -0.0198 
(0.3397) 
C-D Average 
Local Tax Rate 
  -0.0238 
(0.1181) 
  -0.0902 
(0.2045) 
  -0.2300 
(0.3541) 
  -1.3014 
(0.8546) 
C-D 
Unemployment 
Rate 
  -0.3023 
(0.2821) 
  -0.0563 
(0.3728) 
  -0.0605 
(0.4742) 
  0.2191 
(1.0707) 
Number Obs. 7,966 7,966 7,966 4,536 4,536 4,536 2,510 2,510 2,510 751 751 751 
Clustered SE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R2 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.009 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 22. Countries of Interest and their respective colonial rulers, independence, and 
political authoritarian structure variant post-independence. 
Country Colonial Ruler Independence Day Regime Variant 
Ghana Britain March 6th, 1957 Military Oligarchy 
Kenya Britain December 12th, 1963 Competitive One-Party System 
Nigeria Britain October 1st, 1960 Military Oligarchy 
S. Africa Britain December 11th, 1931 Settler Oligarchy 
Uganda Britain October 9th, 1962 Military Oligarchy 
Tanzania Britain April 26th, 1964 Competitive One-Party System 
 
Table 23. Breakdown of Business Classification of EDP businesses. 
Country Non-Profit For-Profit Undecided Other 
Ghana 23.16 69.47 1.05 6.32 
Kenya 6.83 84.54 1.90 6.74 
Nigeria 8.01 84.75 2.33 4.91 
South Africa 11.67 74.17 4.58 9.58 
Uganda 21.18 68.99 2.60 7.22 
Tanzania 12.15 77.35 1.10 9.39 
All 12.63 78.02 2.32 7.03 
 
Table 24. Percentage of EPD businesses with forms of technology or invention protection. 
Country Patents (%) Copyright (%) Trademark (%) 
Ghana 3.16 12.63 17.89 
Kenya 12.41 12.12 25.19 
Nigeria 9.04 8.79 28.94 
South Africa 12.92 15.42 16.67 
Uganda 9.04 9.62 27.00 
Tanzania 14.84 15.38 14.84 
All 10.81 11.42 24.61 
 
Table 25. Number of observations by country and geographic zone.  
Country Observations Geographic Zone 
Ghana 95 West 
Kenya 1,056 East 
Nigeria 387 West 
South Africa 240 South 
Uganda 852 East 
United Republic of Tanzania 182 East 
Total number of observations: 2,812 
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Table 26. Percentage of EPD Businesses for Each Country that Utilize a Particular Type of 
Equity Investment.  
Country Own 
Money 
Angel 
Investor 
Companies Government Venture 
Capital 
N/A Other 
Ghana 67.37 8.42 0 0 3.16 5.26 3.16 
Kenya 69.79 3.98 0.28 0.57 1.80 3.13 7.48 
Nigeria 63.57 2.58 0.78 0.26 1.60 1.03 1.03 
S. Africa 60.83 4.58 1.25 1.25 0.83 4.58 7.08 
Uganda 80.52 1.53 0.70 0.35 0.47 2.46 2.00 
Tanzania 70.33 3.85 3.85 1.10 0 3.30 7.14 
All 71.38 3.24 0.78 0.53 1.21 2.84 4.73 
 
Table 27. Percentage of EPD Businesses for Each Country that Utilize a Particular Type of 
Debt. 
Country Banks Non-Bank 
Institution 
Government Companies Family Other 
Individual 
Other 
Ghana 3.16 5.26 0 1.05 1.05 4.21 3.16 
Kenya 7.39 2.84 0.85 1.99 2.08 3.69 5.68 
Nigeria 2.84 1.29 0.52 0.26 0.26 1.29 0.78 
S. Africa 2.92 0.83 0.83 1.25 1.25 2.08 2.50 
Uganda 5.87 3.29 0.82 1.53 0.59 2.93 1.53 
Tanzania 6.59 2.20 1.10 0.55 2.75 4.95 2.20 
All 5.73 2.63 0.78 1.42 1.32 3.09 3.17 
 
Table 28. Percentage of Businesses where the Primary Founder is Female and Percentage 
of Businesses where any of the Founders are Female. 
Country Primary Founder Female Any Founder Female 
Ghana 28.26 44.57 
Kenya 29.55 43.01 
Nigeria 25.07 45.55 
South Africa 37.55 47.26 
Uganda 24.58 39.59 
Tanzania 27.53 31.46 
All 27.95 41.98 
 
Table 29. Macroeconomic Descripting Statistics for Each Country of Interest. 
Country Population 
(millions) 
GNI per 
Capita 
(2017 
USD) 
Population 
Density 
(people 
per sq km) 
Time 
Required to 
Start Business 
(days) 
Human 
Development 
Index 
(2017) 
HDI 
Rank 
(2017) 
Ghana 28.83 $1,880 126.7 14 0.592 140 
Kenya 49.70 $1,460 87.3 23 0.590 143 
Nigeria 190.89 $2,100 209.6 19 0.532 156 
S. Africa 56.72 $5,430 46.8 45 0.699 111 
Uganda 42.86 $600 213.8 24 0.516 162 
Tanzania 57.31 $910 64.7 29 0.538 154 
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Table 30. Probit Regression of Equity Financing 
This table contains a Probit Regression of various attributes on the probability of a firm being 
selected to receive a positive amount of Equity financing.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.2724*** 
(0.0782) 
-0.2890*** 
(0.0798) 
-0.2338*** 
(0.0815) 
Age -0.0287* 
(0.0167) 
-0.0385** 
(0.0175) 
-0.0410** 
(0.1788) 
Age Squared 0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
For Profit Experience  0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.2675** 
(0.1272) 
Non Profit 
Experience 
 0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
Established Profit 
Goals 
  0.2675** 
(0.1272) 
Social Motivation   0.0487 
(0.1740) 
Invention Based   0.2107*** 
(0.0708) 
Patents   0.4107*** 
(0.0962) 
Copyrights   0.0370 
(0.1011) 
Trademarks   0.2724*** 
(0.0748) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
R2 0.034 0.043 0.071 
No. Observations 2,722 2,695 2,695 
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Table 31. Probit Regression of Debt Financing 
This table contains a Probit Regression of various attributes on the probability of a firm being 
selected to receive a positive amount of Debt financing.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.1434** 
(0.0716) 
-0.1611** 
(0.0726) 
-0.1615** 
(0.0736) 
Age 0.0794*** 
(0.0187) 
0.0720*** 
(0.0192) 
0.0689*** 
(0.0194) 
Age Squared -0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
For Profit Experience  -6.10e-06 
(0.0002) 
-9.40e-06 
(0.0002) 
Non Profit 
Experience 
 0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
Established Profit 
Goals 
  0.3516*** 
(0.1216) 
Social Motivation   0.0299 
(0.1608) 
Invention Based   -0.0280 
(0.0657) 
Patents   0.0324 
(0.1020) 
Copyrights   -0.0626 
(0.1014) 
Trademarks   0.1433** 
(0.0719) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
R2 0.052 0.060 0.066 
No. Observations 2,722 2,716 2,716 
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Table 32. Probit Regression of Philanthropic Contribution Financing 
This table contains a Probit Regression of various attributes on the probability of a firm being 
selected to receive a positive amount of Philanthropic Contribution financing.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female 0.0686 
(0.0570) 
0.0587 
(0.0577) 
0.0806 
(0.0590) 
Age -0.0089 
(0.0136) 
-0.0135 
(0.0140) 
-0.0073 
(0.0143) 
Age Squared 0.00001 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
For Profit Experience  0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
Non Profit 
Experience 
 -0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0004 
(0.0001) 
Established Profit 
Goals 
  -0.6081*** 
(0.0846) 
Social Motivation   0.1083 
(0.1325) 
Invention Based   0.1542*** 
(0.0541) 
Patents   0.0653 
(0.0835) 
Copyrights   0.1863*** 
(0.0800) 
Trademarks   0.2380 
(0.0601) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
R2 0.011 0.017 0.044 
No. Observations 2,722 2,722 2,722 
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Table 33. OLS Regression of Equity Financing 
This table contains an Ordinary Least Squares Regression of various attributes on the log 
amount of Equity financing a firm receives once they are selected to receive funding.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.4044 
(0.3444) 
-0.8348** 
(0.3492) 
-0.7122** 
(0.3547) 
Age 0.2075*** 
(0.0664) 
0.1520** 
(0.0672) 
0.1608** 
(0.0668) 
Age Squared -0.0019** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0014* 
(0.0008) 
-0.0015* 
(0.0008) 
For Profit Experience  -0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
Non Profit 
Experience 
 -0.0004 
(0.0009) 
-0.0005 
(0.0009) 
Established Profit 
Goals 
  1.2376** 
(0.5596) 
Social Motivation   -1.6084** 
(0.5596) 
Invention Based   0.2565 
(0.2910) 
Patents   0.2157 
(0.3545) 
Copyrights   0.5778 
(0.3831) 
Trademarks   0.1216 
(0.2824) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
R2 0.151 0.235 0.268 
No. Observations 301 301 301 
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Table 34. OLS Regression of Debt Financing 
This table contains an Ordinary Least Squares Regression of various attributes on the log 
amount of Debt financing a firm receives once they are selected to receive funding.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.5526** 
(0.2458) 
-0.5903** 
(0.2411) 
-0.6607*** 
(0.2446) 
Age 0.1944*** 
(0.0611) 
0.1376** 
(0.0673) 
0.1297** 
(0.0609) 
Age Squared -0.0012** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0009 
(0.0007) 
-0.0008 
(0.0008) 
For Profit Experience  0.0830* 
(0.0474) 
0.0720 
(0.0480) 
Non Profit 
Experience 
 -0.0847* 
(0.0474) 
-0.0738 
(0.0498) 
Established Profit 
Goals 
  0.5978 
(0.4419) 
Social Motivation   -0.0316 
(0.5415) 
Invention Based   -0.1535 
(0.2190) 
Patents   -0.0175 
(0.3446) 
Copyrights   -0.4519 
(0.3382) 
Trademarks   0.2891 
(0.2291) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
R2 0.198 0.278 0.291 
No. Observations 372 372 372 
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Table 35. OLS Regression of Philanthropic Contribution Financing 
This table contains an Ordinary Least Squares Regression of various attributes on the log 
amount of Philanthropic Contribution financing a firm receives once they are selected to receive 
funding.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female 0.1030 
(0.1611) 
0.0501 
(0.1624) 
0.0474 
(0.1633) 
Age 0.1160*** 
(0.0352) 
0.0942*** 
(0.0363) 
0.0897** 
(0.0367) 
Age Squared -0.0008** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0006 
(0.0004) 
-0.0006 
(0.0004) 
For Profit Experience  0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
Non Profit 
Experience 
 0.0020 
(0.0021) 
0.0017 
(0.0021) 
Established Profit 
Goals 
  -0.1273 
(0.2058) 
Social Motivation   0.1900 
(0.3977) 
Invention Based   -0.1124 
(0.1529) 
Patents   0.2962 
(0.2258) 
Copyrights   -0.2456 
(0.2112) 
Trademarks   0.3155* 
(0.1622) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
R2 0.081 0.124 0.132 
No. Observations 804 804 804 
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Table 36. Heckman Selection Model for Equity Financing 
This table contains the results of the two-stage Heckman Model for sample selection in the 
decision to provide Equity finance to a company, and the magnitude of funding given after 
considering potential selection bias in projects.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Magnitude of Funding 
Female -0.1105 
(0.4970) 
-0.6682 
(0.5144) 
-0.5640 
(0.5084) 
Age 0.2415*** 
(0.0789) 
0.1753** 
(0.0849) 
0.1784** 
(0.0899) 
Age Squared -0.0022** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0017* 
(0.0010) 
-0.0017 
(0.0010) 
For Profit Experience  -0.0003 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
Non Profit Experience  -0.0006 
(0.0010) 
0.0007 
(0.0010) 
Established Profit Goals   0.9531 
(0.6408) 
Social Motives   -1.5814** 
(0.7184) 
Invention Based   0.1688 
(0.5389) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
Selection Decision 
Mean Patents 0.7109*** 
(0.2548) 
0.6686*** 
(0.2597) 
0.5916** 
(0.2626) 
Female -0.2630*** 
(0.0785) 
-0.2800*** 
(0.0801) 
-0.2446*** 
(0.0808) 
Age -0.0279* 
(0.0168) 
-0.0375** 
(0.0176) 
-0.0389** 
(0.0179) 
Age Squared 0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
For Profit Experience  0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Non Profit Experience  0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
Established Profit Goals   0.2631** 
(0.1260) 
Social Motives   0.0818 
(0.1741) 
Invention Based   0.2695*** 
(0.0690) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
Lambda -1.3638 -0.7181 -0.7354 
No. Observations 2,722 2,722 2,722 
Selected 301 301 301 
Not Selected 2,421 2,421 2,421 
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Table 37. Heckman Selection Model for Debt Financing 
This table contains the results of the two-stage Heckman Model for sample selection in the 
decision to provide Debt finance to a company, and the magnitude of funding given after 
considering potential selection bias in projects.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Magnitude of Funding 
Female -0.8322** 
(0.3794) 
-0.8538** 
(0.3755) 
-0.9643** 
(0.4217) 
Age 0.3621** 
(0.1668) 
0.2626* 
(0.1431) 
0.2877* 
(0.1605) 
Age Squared -0.0033* 
(0.0018) 
-0.0022 
(0.0015) 
-0.0024 
(0.0017) 
For Profit Experience  0.0786* 
(0.0464) 
0.0655 
(0.0473) 
Non Profit Experience  -0.0801* 
(0.0464) 
-0.0668 
(0.0473) 
Established Profit Goals   1.3441 
(0.8588) 
Social Motives   0.1435 
(0.6133) 
Invention Based   -0.2106 
(0.2423) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
Selection Decision 
Mean Trademarks 0.4234** 
(0.2102) 
0.4165** 
(0.2115) 
0.3795* 
(0.2124) 
Female -0.1408** 
(0.0717) 
-0.1596** 
(0.0727) 
-0.1604** 
(0.0734) 
Age 0.0789*** 
(0.0187) 
0.0714*** 
(0.0192) 
0.0699*** 
(0.0194) 
Age Squared -0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
For Profit Experience  -3.43e-06 
(0.0002) 
-1.01e-05 
(0.0002) 
Non Profit Experience  0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
Established Profit Goals   0.3438*** 
(0.1216) 
Social Motives   0.0299 
(0.1606) 
Invention Based   -0.0167 
(0.0639) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
Lambda 2.5184 2.0691 2.5824 
No. Observations 2,722 2,722 2,722 
Selected 372 372 372 
Not Selected 2,350 2,350 2,350 
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Table 38. Heckman Selection Model for Philanthropic Contribution Financing 
This table contains the results of the two-stage Heckman Model for sample selection in the 
decision to provide Philanthropic Contribution finance to a company, and the magnitude of 
funding given after considering potential selection bias in projects.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Magnitude of Funding 
Female 0.0971 
(0.1937) 
0.0387 
(0.1877) 
0.0304 
(0.1956) 
Age 0.1168*** 
(0.0380) 
0.0969** 
(0.0426) 
0.0960*** 
(0.0367) 
Age Squared -0.0008* 
(0.0005) 
-0.0007 
(0.0005) 
-0.0006 
(0.0004) 
For Profit Experience  0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
Non Profit Experience  0.0021 
(0.0020) 
-0.0020 
(0.0020) 
Established Profit Goals   -0.0191 
(0.9343) 
Social Motives   0.2421 
(0.4287) 
Invention Based   -0.0995 
(0.3345) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
Selection Decision 
Mean Competition Age -0.0142* 
(0.0075) 
-0.0133* 
(0.0075) 
-0.0133* 
(0.0076) 
Female 0.6640 
(0.0570) 
0.0570 
(0.0578) 
0.0694 
(0.0587) 
Age -0.0058 
(0.0134) 
-0.0103 
(0.0142) 
-0.0012 
(0.0145) 
Age Squared 0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
4.25e-05 
(0.0002) 
For Profit Experience  0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
Non Profit Experience  -0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0003 
(0.005) 
Established Profit Goals   -0.6034*** 
(0.0843) 
Social Motives   0.1267 
(0.1325) 
Invention Based   0.1915*** 
(0.0528) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
Lambda -0.1175 -0.2629 -0.1755 
No. Observations 2,722 2,722 2,722 
Selected 804 804 804 
Not Selected 1,918 1,918 1,918 
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Appendix D 
 
Table 39. Information on Firms Included in Historical ReferenceUSA Data 
Year Number of Individual Firms Percent Firms < 20 
Employees 
2003 12,655,586 89.05% 
2004 12,523,962 89.27% 
2005 13,095,624 88.91% 
2006 13,230,400 88.78% 
2007 13,582,340 91.31% 
2008 13,766,183 91.29% 
2009 13,557,763 91.34% 
2010 13,724,001 89.68% 
 
Table 40. State Homestead Exemption Levels in the Pre- and Post-Policy Change 
State 2004 Homestead Exemption 2006 Homestead Exemption 
Alabama 10,000 10,000 
Alaska 54,800 67,500 
Arizona 100,000 150,000 
Arkansas Unlimited Unlimited 
California 75,000 75,000 
Colorado 90,000 90,000 
Connecticut 150,000 150,000 
Delaware 0 50,000 
District of Columbia Unlimited Unlimited 
Florida Unlimited Unlimited 
Georgia 20,000 20,000 
Hawaii 20,000 20,000 
Idaho 50,000 50,000 
Illinois 15,000 30,000 
Indiana 15,000 30,000 
Iowa Unlimited Unlimited 
Kansas Unlimited Unlimited 
Kentucky 10,000 10,000 
Louisiana 25,000 25,000 
Maine 70,000 70,000 
Maryland 0 0 
Massachusetts 300,000 500,000 
Michigan 18,450 31,900 
Minnesota 200,000 200,000 
Mississippi 150,000 150,000 
Missouri 15,000 15,000 
Montana 200,000 100,000 
Nebraska 12,500 12,500 
Nevada 200,000 350,000 
New Hampshire 200,000 200,000 
New Jersey 18,450 18,450 
New Mexico 60,000 60,000 
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New York 20,000 100,000 
North Carolina 20,000 37,000 
North Dakota 80,000 80,000 
Ohio 10,000 10,000 
Oklahoma Unlimited Unlimited 
Oregon 33,000 39,600 
Pennsylvania 18,450 18,450 
Rhode Island 150,000 200,000 
South Carolina 10,000 10,000 
South Dakota Unlimited Unlimited 
Tennessee 7,500 7,500 
Texas Unlimited Unlimited 
Utah 40,000 40,000 
Vermont 150,000 150,000 
Virginia 10,000 10,000 
Washington 40,000 40,000 
West Virginia 50,000 50,000 
Wisconsin 40,000 40,000 
Wyoming 20,000 20,000 
 
Table 41. List of Industry Subsectors by 2-Digit NAICS Codes 
2-Digit NAICS Subsector 
11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 
21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 
22 Utilities 
23 Construction 
31-33 Manufacturing 
42 Wholesale Trade 
44-45 Retail Trade 
48-49 Transportation and Warehousing 
51 Information 
52 Finance and Insurance 
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 
56 Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services 
61 Educational Services 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 
72 Accommodation and Food Services 
81 Other Services (except Public Administration) 
92 Public Administration 
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Table 42. Difference-in-Difference coefficient estimations on the percent of businesses that 
entered the market for each firm type, state, industry, and year.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post Policy Change 0.0245*** 
(0.0084) 
0.0245*** 
(0.0085) 
0.0245*** 
(0.0085) 
Small Firm 0.7717*** 
(0.0084) 
0.7717*** 
(0.0085) 
0.7717*** 
(0.0085) 
(Post*Small) -0.0491*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0491*** 
(0.0120) 
-0.0491*** 
(0.0120) 
State FE No Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.755 0.753 0.752 
Observations 5,090 5,090 5,090 
 
Table 43. Difference-in-Difference coefficient estimations on the percent of businesses that 
exited the market for each firm type, state, industry, and year.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post Policy Change -0.0137* 
(0.0079) 
-0.0137* 
(0.0080) 
-0.0137* 
(0.0080) 
Small Firm 0.7230*** 
(0.0079) 
0.7230*** 
(0.0080) 
0.7230*** 
(0.0080) 
(Post*Small) 0.0274** 
(0.0112) 
0.0274** 
(0.0112) 
0.0274** 
(0.0113) 
State FE No Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.773 0.771 0.770 
Observations 5,086 5,086 5,086 
 
Table 44. Triple-Difference coefficient estimations on the percent of businesses that entered 
the market for each firm type, state, industry, and year. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post Policy Change 0.0256** 
(0.0121) 
0.0256** 
(0.0121) 
0.2556** 
(0.0122) 
Small Firm 0.7758*** 
(0.0121) 
0.7758*** 
(0.0121) 
0.7758*** 
(0.0122) 
Low Exemption State 0.0040 
(0.0119) 
0.0040 
(0.0320) 
0.0040 
(0.0321) 
(Post*Small) -0.0511*** 
(0.0171) 
-0.0511*** 
(0.0171) 
-0.0511*** 
(0.0172) 
(Post*Low) -0.0002 
(0.0169) 
-0.0020 
(0.0170) 
-0.0020 
(0.0170) 
(Small*Low) -0.0079 
(0.0169) 
-0.0079 
(0.0170) 
-0.0079 
(0.0170) 
(Post*Small*Low) 0.0041 
(0.0239) 
0.0041 
(0.0240) 
0.0041 
(0.0241) 
State FE No Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.755 0.753 0.751 
Observations            5,090            5,090            5,090 
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Table 45. Triple-Difference coefficient estimations on the percent of businesses that exited 
the market for each firm type, state, industry, and year. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post Policy Change -0.0107 
(0.0113) 
-0.0107 
(0.0114) 
-0.0107 
(0.0114) 
Small Firm 0.7348*** 
(0.0113) 
0.7348*** 
(0.0114) 
0.7348*** 
(0.0114) 
Low Exemption State 0.0115 
(0.0112) 
0.0115 
(0.0300) 
0.0115 
(0.0301) 
(Post*Small) 0.0215 
(0.0160) 
0.0215 
(0.0161) 
0.0215 
(0.0161) 
(Post*Low) -0.0058 
(0.0159) 
-0.0058 
(0.0159) 
-0.0058 
(0.0159) 
(Small*Low) -0.0231 
(0.0158) 
-0.0231 
(0.0159) 
-0.0231 
(0.0159) 
(Post*Small*Low) 0.0116 
(0.0224) 
0.0116 
(0.0225) 
0.0116 
(0.0226) 
State FE No No Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.773 0.771 0.770 
Observations 5,086 5,086 5,086 
 
Table 46. Sign and significance of the Difference-in-Difference coefficient estimates on the 
percent of businesses that entered the market by industry.  
Industry Post Policy Change Small Firm (Post*Small) 
11               − ***               + ***               + *** 
21               +               + ***               − 
22               − *               + ***               + ** 
23               −               +***               +*** 
31-33               +***               +***               −*** 
42               +*               +***               −*** 
44-45               +***               +***               −*** 
48-49               −***               +***               +*** 
51               −               +***               +* 
52               +***               +***               −*** 
53               +               +***               − 
54               +***               +***               −*** 
55               +***               +***               −*** 
56               −               +***               + 
61               +***               +***               −*** 
62               −**               +***               +*** 
71               −*               +***               +*** 
72               −               +***               + 
81               +               +***               −* 
92               +***               +***               −*** 
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Table 47. Sign and significance of the Difference-in-Difference coefficient estimates on the 
percent of businesses that exited the market by industry.  
Industry Post Policy Change Small Firm (Post*Small) 
11               −               +***               +* 
21               −*               +***               +** 
22               −**               +***               +*** 
23               −***               +***               +*** 
31-33               −***               +***               +*** 
42               −***               +***               +*** 
44-45               +               +***               − 
48-49               −***               +***               +*** 
51               −               +***               + 
52               −***               +***               +*** 
53               −               +***               + 
54               −**               +***               +*** 
55               −**               +***               +*** 
56               −***               +***               +*** 
61               +***               +***               −*** 
62               +               +***               − 
71               −               +***               + 
72               −***               +***               +*** 
81               −**               +***               +*** 
92               −***               −***               +*** 
 
Table 48. Triple-Difference coefficient estimations on the percent of businesses that entered 
the market by Industry 
Industry Post Policy Small 
Firm 
Low 
Exemption 
(Post* 
Small) 
(Post* 
Low) 
(Small* 
Low) 
(Small* 
Post*Low) 
11      −***      +***      −      +***      +      +      − 
21      +      +***      −      −      −      +      + 
22      −      +***      +      +      −      −      + 
23      −**      +***      +      +***      +      −      − 
31-33      +***      +***      +***      −***      −      −***      + 
42      +      +***      +      −**      +      −*      − 
44-45      +***      +***      +      −***      +      −      − 
48-49      −***      +***      +      +***      +      −      − 
51      −      +***      −      +*      +      +*      − 
52      +**      +***      −      −***      +      +      − 
53      +      +***      +      −      +      −      − 
54      +***      +***      +      −***      −      −      + 
55      +***      +***      +      −***      −      −      + 
56      −      +***      −      +      +      +      − 
61      +***      +***      −      −***      +      +      − 
62      −      +***      −      +**      +      +      − 
71      −*      +***      −      +**      +      +      − 
72      −      +***      −      +*      +      +      − 
81      +      +***      −      −      +      +      − 
92      +***      +**      −      −***      +      +      − 
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Table 49. Triple-Difference coefficient estimations on the percent of businesses that exited 
the market by industry 
Industry Post Policy Small 
Firm 
Low 
Exemption 
(Post* 
Small) 
(Post* 
Low) 
(Small* 
Low) 
(Small* 
Post*Low) 
11      −**      +***      −      +***      +**      +**      −*** 
21      −      +***      +**      +      −      −***      + 
22      −      +***      +      +      −      −*      + 
23      −***      +***      +      +***      −      −      + 
31-33      −***      +***      +***      +***      −      −***      + 
42      −***      +***      +*      +***      −      −***      + 
44-45      +      +***      +      −      −      −**      + 
48-49      −      +***      +**      +**      −      −***      + 
51      +      +***      −      −      −      +      +* 
52      −**      +***      +      +***      +      −      − 
53      −      +***      +      +      −      −      + 
54      −      +***      +      +      −      −*      + 
55      −      +***      −      +**      +      +      − 
56      −**      +***      −      +***      +      +      − 
61      +**      +***      +      −***      −      −      + 
62      +      +***      +      −*      −      −      + 
71      −*      +***      −      +**      +      +      −* 
72      −**      +***      +**      +***      −      −**      + 
81      −**      +***      −      +***      +      +*      −* 
92      −**      −***      +***      +      −      −      + 
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